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INTRODUCTION
Patent law is territorially confined within national borders. Gener-
ally, a patentee can exclude anyone from using, making, selling, or
offering to sell his invention, but only when that infringing act occurs in
the same country in which the invention is patented. U.S. patents, for
example, do not confer rights of action against those who infringe out-
side the borders of the United States. Similar territoriality principles
govern the patent laws of other nations as well. In this sense, patent law
is national in character; to enforce patent rights in a specific country, an
invention must be patented in that country.
While patents and patent law are limited territorially, modern tech-
nology is becoming increasingly transnational. As a result, judicial and
legislative bodies across the world have grappled with the extent to
which the territoriality of patent law should be extended in order to
properly protect investments in patented technology. The expansion of
patent territoriality has caused concern among numerous commentators.
Many commentators have objected to this expansion on comity grounds
and have taken the extraterritorial extension of domestic patent jurisdic-
tion in various countries as an opportunity to renew calls for
international patent law harmonization.
The existence of and increase in transnational technologies does not,
however, necessitate an expansion of traditional territorial patent limits.
In fact, when faced with the rise of international transportation in the
early twentieth century, the international community responded by re-
ducing, not increasing, the scope of domestic patent rights: an exception
from patent infringement was created for conveyances involved in inter-
national trade entering another country "temporarily or accidentally."
The "temporary presence exception," as it has come to be known, finds
its intellectual origins in nineteenth century English law. The exception
was later adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States and thereaf-
ter adopted internationally in the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Intellectual Property. Throughout the exception's history, there have
been two primary policy objectives that have informed the exception's
use, namely, (1) to eliminate the ability of private citizens to detain con-
veyances of international commerce in foreign ports by bringing patent
infringement actions, and (2) to place international conveyances outside
of the reach of every domestic patent system except for the conveyance's
home patent system.
In essence, the temporary presence exception cedes a small portion
of the rights usually conferred to individual patentees (namely, the right
to enforce a patent against foreign conveyances) in exchange for reduced
patent adherence costs for international conveyances (in the form of re-
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duced patent informational costs and reduced international patent liabil-
ity). The exception effectively reduces the territorial scope of a patent in
such a way that the unauthorized use of a patented technology in a con-
veyance engaged in international trade is not actionable, even if the use
occurs within the country in which the patent issued.
To avoid liability under the temporary presence exception, foreign
conveyances must meet certain conditions. First, they must be vessels,
aircraft, or land vehicles. Second, they must enter another Paris Conven-
tion country on a temporary or accidental basis. Lastly, the patented
device must be used exclusively for the needs of the conveyance. Every
court that has interpreted the exception has determined that regular, ex-
tended entrances into a foreign country are "temporary" for purposes of
the exception. For example, in National Steel Car,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that "temporarily" meant
"entering for a period of time of finite duration with the sole purpose of
engaging in international commerce. 2 Courts in England and Germany
have reached similar conclusions. This interpretation of "temporarily"
means that conveyances employing patented devices are immune from
charges of patent infringement, as long as the conveyance is engaged in
international commerce in a foreign, Paris Convention country. For ex-
ample, foreign conveyances are not subject to French patent law while in
France temporarily, nor are French conveyances subject to foreign patent
laws while in foreign countries temporarily. However, conveyances are
still subject to the patent laws of their home country when they are in
that country.
Inherent in the reciprocity requirement of the temporary presence
exception is a condition that all conveyances have a particular national-
ity. However, the exception itself does not prescribe how a conveyance's
nationality is determined. In the absence of an explicit statutory defini-
tion, courts must look to international law to determine a conveyance's
nationality. For some types of conveyances, international law permits the
selection of conveyance nationality. Since conveyance owners can select
their conveyance's nationality, they can effectively opt-in to a national
patent system, thus opting-out of every other domestic patent system
worldwide.
This Article argues that the temporary presence exception was not
designed to allow conveyance owners the ability to select the most opti-
mal patent system under which to be subject. It also examines the
ramifications of the temporary presence exception on international
I. Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
2. Id.
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commerce and concludes that increased use of the exception may result
in reduced values for patents relating to international conveyances, re-
duced incentives to invest in and develop technologies in international
conveyances, and a decrease in the quality of various domestic patent
systems worldwide. Finally, this Article proposes a solution to these
problems.
The temporary presence exception has received some attention in
academic literature, which has focused on the interpretation of "tempo-
rarily." This Article will examine the exception from a different angle,
focusing on the impact that the increased use of the exception may have
for users of international conveyances and innovators in the field of in-
ternational transport. Part I begins with an overview of patent law with a
particular focus on territoriality and nationality, before detailing the his-
tory and purpose of the temporary presence exception. The treatment and
interpretation of the exception by various domestic courts is also exam-
ined. Part 1I provides an overview of the international system of
conveyance nationality and registration as it applies to conveyances in-
volved in international trade. Part III argues that the confluence of
international registration regimes with the temporary presence exception
can effectively insulate conveyances from the reach of patent laws glob-
ally and demonstrates how such infringement avoidance is possible. Part
IV proposes a solution to the over-breadth of the exception that retains
the primary objectives of the exception. This solution involves the crea-
tion of an international registry of patents that would overcome a
temporary presence exception defense of patent infringement. The pro-
posal also outlines a method for domestic courts to determine foreign
vehicle nationality that would limit the ability of vehicle owners to game
the global patent system via the exception.
I. PATENT LAW: THE TEMPORARY PRESENCE EXCEPTION
A. Patent Law Overview
Although patent law varies in many respects from country to coun-
try, there are certain features that are common to all domestic patent
systems.3 In order to provide a background for examining the temporary
presence exception, this section will briefly describe the international
patent system, and then, as an example of a domestic patent system, out-
line the basics of patent law in the United States.
3. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the variations among national patent
systems.
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A patent is a government-issued property right that grants an inven-
tor the right to exclude others from making use of the invention for a
limited time, in return for the public disclosure of the invention. Patents
are enforceable only within the country from which they issue. This ter-
ritoriality limits the ability to globally enforce a patent. Various
multinational treaties have sought to standardize the domestic processes
required to obtain a patent. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which has been adopted by all
member-states of the World Trade Organization, created a global base-
line for patentability requirements. TRIPS established that any invention
may be patented in any technological field as long as that invention
meets three basic criteria: the invention must be new, involve an inven-
tive step, and be capable of industrial application TRIPS also
established the types of subject matter that individual countries may ex-
clude from patentability.
6
The patent system, particularly the exclusive right to practice an in-
vention, is designed to encourage inventors to create, patent, and
commercialize new inventions.7 The right to exclude others from practic-
ing a patented invention is particularly valuable for inventions that would
otherwise be readily copied and sold by competitors.8 In exchange for
the exclusive right to practice his invention, an inventor is required to
publicize the manner in which the invention is made and used. This in-
formation is disclosed in the patent's specification. The disclosure
requirement allows others skilled in a patent's field of art to make use of
an invention.9 Most nations have specific requirements for what must be
contained within the specification.' ° Generally, patent infringement oc-
curs when anyone other than the patentee or a licensee makes
unauthorized use of subject matter that is within the scope of a patent's
claims."
In the United States, the authority to grant patents rests in the Con-
stitution, which empowers the federal government to create a system
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS].
5. Id. art. 27.1.
6. Id. art. 27.2 (inventions in contravention of public decency or morality), art. 27.3
(plants and animals, and medical procedures).
7. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 6 (2008).
8. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933).
10. World Intell. Prop. Org., Fields of Intellectual Property Protection, in WIPO IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW, AND USE 17 (WIPO Publ'n No. 489, 2d ed.
2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/.
I1. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (defining patent infringement).
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designed to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ...
Discoveries."'2 Almost immediately after ratification of the Constitution,
Congress passed the Patent Act of 1790."3 Shortly thereafter, Congress
passed the Patent Act of 1836, which established the Patent Office and
granted it the power to examine patent applications for compliance with
the statutory requirements of the act.' 4 The Patent Act of 1952 is cur-
rently in force and controls the issuance of patents.'5
For an invention to qualify for patenting in the United States, an
inventor must demonstrate that the invention is novel,'6 useful, 7 and
non-obvious.' 8 These three requirements also meet the standards for
patentability established by TRIPS.' 9 Along with a specification de-
scribing the invention, U.S. patent applications must contain one or
more claims, which are descriptions of the precise limits of a patent's
scope. Claims are the metes and bounds of the patent property right
and determine the extent of a patentee's right to exclude .
Importantly, for infringement to be actionable, the infringing activity
must occur within the United States;2' U.S patents do not confer any
right of action against activities occurring outside of the United States.22
Moreover, patents issued in foreign jurisdictions cannot form the basis
for an infringement action in the United States.23
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. Act of Apr. 10. 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
14. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1870).
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
16. Id. § 102.
17. Id. § 101.
18. Id. § 103.
19. The U.S. novelty and non-obviousness requirements are equivalent to the TRIPS
requirements that an invention be new and inventive, and the U.S. usefulness requirement
meets TRIPS industrial application requirement. See TRIPS, supra note 4, at 17; see also,
World Intell. Prop. Org., supra note 10, at 14.
20. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 25 (3d ed. 2002).
21. See, e.g., EEOC v. Abraham Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1755, (2007); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,
203 (1993); but see NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 E3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(granting extraterritorial reach to a system claim). For more on the extraterritorial reach of
patent law, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2119 (2008); Melissa F Wasserman, Note, Divided Infringement: Expanding the Ex-
traterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281 (2007).
22. However, recently the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that U.S. patent
law had some extraterritorial reach with regards to patent claims covering systems. See NTP
Inc. 418 F.3d at 1316-17 (holding that the Blackberry system can be "used" wholly within the
United States when, even though messages are routed through controllers in Canada).
23. While foreign activity cannot, in most cases, constitute infringement due to territo-
riality principles, it can play a significant role in assessing whether or not an inventor should
receive a patent in the first place. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (precluding a patent grant if
"the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country").
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B. The History of the Temporary Presence Exception
In 185 1, the Chancery Court of England heard the case of Caldwell
v. Vanvlissengen.24 The case involved a Dutch ship that made regular
stops in England and employed a screw propeller patented in England.
Vanvlissengen, the ship's owner, argued that his ship should not be sub-
ject to English patents because it had been made in Holland, was owned
by Dutch citizens, and was manned by Dutch nationals. 25 The chancery
court disagreed and granted an injunction against the Dutch vessel.26
In direct response to the court's ruling, the English Parliament
amended the patent law to provide foreign ships with an exception to
infringement liability when in English ports or waters." The exception
created by Parliament was much broader than that requested by the
Dutch ship owner in Caldwell. Much of the owner's argument for an ex-
ception concerned situations in which a ship was "accidentally" forced
into an English port by a storm.28 Apparently, the Dutch ship owner's
concern over the application of English patent laws against the acciden-
tal entrance of a foreign vessel was not shared by the English Parliament,
as it did not include the accidental language in the statute. Indeed, it ap-
pears that Parliament was more concerned with English ships being
subject to unfamiliar foreign patent systems, rather than the accidental
landing of ships in a foreign harbor. Thus, it appears that Parliament
sought to reduce the liability and accompanying information costs on
English shippers.
24. Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen, (1851) 68 Eng. Rep. 571 (Ch.).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 83, 26 (Eng.). The statute
states:
[N]o letters patent for any invention (granted after the passing of this Act) shall ex-
tend to prevent use of such invention in any foreign ship or vessel, or for the
navigation of any foreign ship or vessel, which may be in any port of Her Majesty's
dominions, or in any waters within the jurisdiction of any of Her Majesty's Courts,
where such invention is not so used for the manufacture of any goods or commodi-
ties to be vended within or exported from Her Majesty's dominions: provided
always, that this enactment shall not extend to ships or vessels of any foreign state
of which the laws authorize subjects of such foreign state, having patents or like
privileges for the exclusive use or exercise of inventions within its territories, to
prevent or interfere with the use of such inventions in British ships or vessels, or in
or about the navigation of British ships or vessels, while in the ports of such foreign
state, or in the waters within the jurisdiction of its courts, where such inventions are
not so used for the manufacture of goods or commodities to be vended within or
exported from the territories of such foreign state.
Id.
28. Caldwell, 68 Eng. Rep. at 574.
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Further demonstrating Parliament's concern with fair treatment of
English ships in foreign ports, the statutory exception contained a recip-
rocal requirement: to be eligible, a foreign ship must hail from a country
that allowed English ships to enter its ports without fear of patent liabil-
ity.29 The law did not, however, define how the nationality of foreign
ships was to be determined.
Four years after Parliament amended the English patent laws, the
Supreme Court of the United States for the first time addressed the ap-
plication of U.S. patents against foreign ships temporarily located in
U.S. territorial waters in Brown v. Duchesne.° Brown involved a ship
making a journey between Boston and Miquelon, a French colony off the
coast of Newfoundland, Canada.3 The owner of a patent for an improved
means of constructing a "gaff'-a pole attached to the mast of a sailing
ship that allowed use of a four-sided, rather than triangular, sail-
accused the ship's owner of patent infringement.32 The ship was owned
by a French citizen and had been fitted with the gaff in France where no
corresponding French patent covered the invention.33
The Supreme Court framed the question before it as "whether any
improvement in the construction or equipment of a foreign vessel, for
which a patent has been obtained in the United States, can be used by
such vessel within the jurisdiction of the United States, while she is tem-
porarily there for the purposes of commerce, without the consent of the
patentee"[.],34 The Court noted at the outset that a strict reading of the
patent statute "would seem to sanction the claim" of the patentee. 3 How-
ever, relying on the perceived intent of Congress in enacting the Patent
Act, the Court found that U.S. patents were not enforceable against for-
eign vessels lawfully harbored in U.S. ports.36 Therefore, the Brown
Court held that the use of a patented device in the "construction, fitting
out, or equipment" of foreign vessels coming into or leaving U.S. ports,
did not constitute infringement provided that the device had been placed
upon the vessel in another country and such placement was "authorized
by the laws of the country to which she belongs. 37
The Court gave two principal reasons for its holding: first, the Court
found that the use of the patented invention aboard the French vessel
29. Id.
30. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).
31. Id. at 187-88.
32. Id. at 193.
33. Id. at 193-94.
34. Id. at 194.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 198.
37. Id. at 198-99.
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resulted in minimal to no damage to Brown;38 second, the Court feared
that a finding that a patentee had the right to enforce a patent against for-
eign vessels would be tantamount to granting a private citizen "political
power" over the United States government. 9 On this second point, the
Court felt that "the right to interfere with foreign intercourse, or with
foreign ships visiting [U.S.] ports, was evidently not in the mind of the
Legislature, nor intended to be granted to the patentee. 40 The right to
enforce patents against foreign vessels temporarily docked in the United
States, the Court reasoned, would improperly constrain the treaty-
making power of Congress. 4' The Court acknowledged that Congress had
the power to regulate the terms and regulations of foreign vessels enter-
ing U.S. ports; however, the Court doubted whether Congress had the
power to grant individual patent holders the "power to embarrass [United
States] commerce and intercourse with foreign nations. 4 1
The Brown decision is noteworthy as the initial adoption of the tem-
porary presence exception doctrine by an American court. The holding
granted foreign vessels a broad exception from patent infringement in
the United States. As long as any patented devices were constructed into
a vessel outside of the United States and the vessel was lawfully within a
U.S. port, no patent infringement actions could be brought against the
vessel. Unlike the prior English statute and the subsequent statutory
codification of the exception in the United States, Brown did not require
any sort of reciprocity from the country in which a visiting vessel hailed.
Brown merely required that a vessel be "foreign" in order to be protected
under the exception. As Brown only required a "foreign" vessel, the
38. Id. at 196. This is a questionable ground for refusing to enforce a patent. There is no
section of the Patent Act that recognizes the right to infringe in cases in which there is mini-
mal or no damage to the patentee. Furthermore, the unauthorized use of the patent in Brown
does not appear to have been harmless. At a minimum, it appears that the patentee suffered
damages in the form of lost licensing royalties from the unauthorized use of the gaff.
39. Id. at 198.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The Court also stated that:
Congress may unquestionably, under its power to regulate commerce, prohibit any
foreign ship from entering our ports, which, in its construction or equipment, uses
any improvement patented in this country, or may prescribe the terms and regula-
tions upon which such vessel shall be allowed to enter. Yet it may perhaps be
doubted whether Congress could by law confer on an individuals [sic], or individu-
als, a right which would in any degree impair the constitutional powers of the
legislative or executive departments of the Government, or which might put it in
their power to embarrass our commerce and intercourse with foreign nations, or en-
danger our amicable relations.
Id. But see 5 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.05[4] (2007) (claiming that Brown
"also acknowledged Congress' power to regulate the matter").
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Court did not address the manner of determining a vessel's nationality
for purposes of the exception. However, the Court in Brown seems to
have implicitly adopted, albeit in dicta, the argument of the vessel owner
that nationality is determined by the owner's domicile. "3
After Brown, the temporary presence exception gained international
acceptance. The exception was adopted internationally in the 1919 Con-
vention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation." The exception
contained in the 1919 Convention was narrower than the exception
carved out in Brown in two respects. First, the 1919 Convention excepted
only aircraft, whereas the exception in Brown, while explicitly covering
only foreign ships, arguably extends to airplanes and other vessels.45
Second, unlike Brown, which provided a general exception from patent
liability, the 1919 Convention's exception merely protected infringing
foreign airplanes from seizure in foreign countries. Under the 1919 Con-
vention, a plane was required to post a security deposit in the amount
fixed by the local authority, or by prior agreement, in order to avoid sei-
zure on patent infringement grounds. 6
In 1923, a proposal was submitted to amend the International Con-
vention for the Protection of Industrial Property, known as the Paris
43. In arguing for non-infringement, the vessel owner in Brown argued that an interna-
tional vessel is governed exclusively by the law of the country to which the vessel belongs,
which is the country of domicile of the owner: "What shall or does constitute a vessel must be
determined exclusively by the law of the country to which the vessel belongs, i.e., by the law
of the owner's domicil*" Brown, 60 U.S. at 188. While Brown did not reach the question of
choice of law, nor explicitly state how vessel nationality is determined, the court found that the
Alcyon was French, even though it had never traveled to France, but journeyed only between
Boston and a French colony near Canada. Id. at 193. Brown dictates that a vessel need only
follow the patent laws of "the country to which she belongs" without providing guidance on
how the determination of that country is made. Id. at 199.
44. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter 1919 Convention]. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 246-47 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., Harvard Univ. Press
1930); Rajita Sharma & Heather Forrest, A Lifeline for Infringing Ships, 25 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 430, 434 (2003).
45. Because Brown was decided in 1856, and the Wright Brothers did not conduct their
famous flight until 1903, Brown's holding obviously does not place aircraft within its excep-
tion for temporarily present vessels; the holding refers only to "ships." However, the Court's
reasoning would include airplanes within the contours of the exception. The Brown court was
principally concerned with impediments to international commerce posed by private patent
rights. Brown, 60 U.S. at 197. Also, Brown references "vessels" and "ports," terms that would
likely encompass more "modem" modes of commerce, such as airplanes and airports, as well.
46. 1919 Convention, supra note 44, art. 18. ("Every aircraft passing through the teri-
tory of a contracting state, including landing and stoppages reasonably necessary for the
purpose of such transit, shall be exempt from any seizure on the ground of infringement of
patents, design or model, subject to the deposit of security the amount of which is default of
amicable agreement shall be fixed with the least delay by the competent authority of the place
of seizure.").
[Vol. 15:1
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• 47Convention. The Paris Convention was the first major international
treaty designed to harmonize international intellectual property rights.48
As of December 2008, the Paris Convention had 172 signatory nations,
including nearly every major industrial nation. 49 The proposed change to
the Paris Convention contained a version of the temporary presence ex-
ception that was much broader than the exception contained in the 1919
Convention and much more closely aligned with the policy considera-
tions at work in the Brown exception. The Paris Convention exception
explicitly applied to all forms of transport and completely eliminated
liability for conveyances under certain circumstances. ° The 1925 Hague
Revision to the Paris Convention Article 5ter provides:
In any country of the Union the following shall not be consid-
ered as infringements of the rights of the patentee:
1. the use on board vessels of other countries of the Union of
devices forming the subject of his patent in the body of the ves-
sel, in the machinery, tackle, gear and other accessories, when
such vessels temporarily or accidentally enter the waters of the
said country, provided that such devices are used there exclu-
sively for the needs of the vessel;
2. the use of devices forming the subject of the patent in the con-
struction or operation of aircraft or land vehicles of other
countries of the Union, or of accessories of such aircraft or land
vehicles, when those aircraft or land vehicles temporarily or ac-
cidentally enter the said country.5'
Article 5ter broadened the scope of the temporary presence excep-
tion adopted in Brown by explicitly including "aircraft" and "land
47. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature
Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, as revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
48. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., TREATIES AND CONTRACTING PARTIES: GENERAL
INFORMATION, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general (last visited on Sept. 14, 2008).
49. For a complete list of signatory nations, see World Intell. Prop. Org., Contracting
Parties to the Paris Convention, May 2, 2008, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/
en/documents/pdf/paris.pdf. Two notable countries which have yet to join the Paris Conven-
tion are Taiwan and Iran. Id.
50. See Sharma & Forrest, supra note 44, at 435.
51. Paris Convention, supra note 47, art. 5ter. The Hague revision entered into force in
the United States in 1931. Paris Convention, signed at Hague Nov. 6, 1925, entered into force
Mar. 6, 1931,47 Stat. 1789, T.S. No. 834 (advice and consent of the Senate, Dec. 16, 1930;
entered into force Mar. 6, 193 1).
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51vehicles," along with ships, as conveyances eligible for protection.
Also, unlike the exception in Brown, the Paris Convention exception in-
cluded a reciprocity requirement. As treaties apply only between
member countries, the exception can only be invoked by a member na-
tion's conveyances when entering into other member nations.
Conveyances from non-member nations do not enjoy protection under
the exception, nor are conveyances from member nations protected when
entering into non-member countries. The Paris Convention amendment
thus implicitly requires that all conveyances seeking protection under the
temporary presence exception have a particular nationality. The national-
ity of a conveyance is therefore of great importance when evaluating the
applicability of the exception. The Paris Convention, unfortunately, does
not articulate the manner for determining conveyance nationality for
purposes of the exception.
C. After the Paris Convention: Domestic Statutes and Case Law
1. The Requirements of the Exception: Domestic Statutes
Since the international adoption of the temporary presence exception
in the Paris Convention, member nations have gradually amended their
domestic statutes to reflect that international obligation. While all of the
domestic statutes stem from Article 5ter of the Paris Convention, the
statutes are not identical. Indeed, the statutes that have resulted from the
adoption of the temporary presence exception can be grouped into two
categories: a larger group of domestic statutes that grants different rights
for different types of foreign conveyances (differentiating sea vessels
from land vehicles and aircraft), and a smaller group of statutes which
does not differentiate between conveyance types.53
52. It should be noted that there is some confusion as to whether regular, periodic en-
tries were intended to be covered under Article 5ter. The original French draft of Article 5ter
used the word "pdn~trer," a word that suggests a less than continual relationship. The delegates
from Czechoslovakia suggested clarification as to whether regular entries into a country were
covered under the exception and, if so, that "p~nrtrer" be changed to "entrer." The English
version of Article 5ter contains the word "enter," i.e., "entrer" while the French version retains
"pfnrtrer," and clarification as to the applicability of continual entries was not given. Sharma
& Forrest, supra note 44, at 435. Regardless, as described more fully in this section, numerous
international court decisions have found that continual entries are covered by the exception,
thereby mooting the issue.
53. Some countries have adopted Article 5ter by reference. See, e.g., Ley No. 354, Sept.
19, 2000, Ley de Patentes de Invencion, Modelo de Utilidad y Disenos Industriales [Law of
Patents, Utility Models, and Industrial Designs], sec. 46(b), 19 Sept. 2000 (Nicar.); Decreto
Numero 57, Sept. 18, 2000, Propiedad Industrial, sec. IV, para. 130(d) (Guat.). These coun-
tries implicitly fall within the group of countries adopting the "construction" language, which
is contained in Article 5ter.
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The vast majority of countries that have codified the temporary pres-
ence exception have adopted language that mirrors the language of the
Paris Convention.54 These countries grant exceptions to patent infringe-
ment for inventions used in the "construction or operation" of aircraft
and land vehicles of foreign nations. This "construction" language stems
from the Chicago Convention." The Chicago Convention excepted from
infringement liability the use and installation of patented repair parts on
aircraft in a foreign nation 6  However, Article 5ter of the Paris
54. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1990, § 118 (Austl.); Patenittilaki [Patents Act], No. 550 of
Dec. 15, 1967, as amended by Act No. 243 of Mar. 21, 1997, ch. 1, § 5 (Fin.); The Patents Act,
No. 39 of 1970; India Code (1999), § 49; Patents Act, 1992 (Act No. 42/1992) (Ir.); Rijksoc-
trooiwet 1995 [Patent Act 1995], art. 54, Stb. 1995, 51 (Neth.); The Patents Act, 1953, § 79
(N.Z.); Patents Act 57 of 1978 s. 71 (S. Afr.); Estatuto de ]a Propiedad Industrial [Industrial
Property Code] (R.D.-Ley of July 16, 1929), as last amended by Law No. 17/1975 of May 2,
1975, § 52 (Spain); Patents Act of 1971 [Ch. 26:03], as last amended by Act 20/1994 (s.7),
§ 81 (Zimb.).
55. Convention on Int'l Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, TIAS No. 1591, 15
UNTS 295.
56. Id. art. 27 reads:
(a) While engaged in international air navigation, any authorized entry of aircraft of
a contracting State into the territory of another contracting State or authorized tran-
sit across the territory of such State with or without landings shall not entail any
seizure or detention of the aircraft or any claim against the owner or operator
thereof or any other interference therewith by or on behalf of such State or any per-
son therein, on the ground that the construction, mechanism, parts, accessories or
operation of the aircraft is an infringement of any patent, design, or model duly
granted or registered in the State whose territory is entered by the aircraft, it being
agreed that no deposit of security in connection with the foregoing exemption from
seizure or detention of the aircraft shall in any case be required in the State entered
by such aircraft.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article shall also be applicable to the
storage of spare parts and spare equipment for the aircraft and the right to use and
install the same in the repair of an aircraft of a contracting State in the territory of
any other contracting State, provided that any patented part or equipment so stored
shall not be sold or distributed internally in or exported commercially from the con-
tracting State entered by the aircraft.
(c) The benefits of this Article shall apply only to such States, parties to this Con-
vention, as either (1) are parties to the International Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property and to any amendments thereof; or (2) have enacted patent
laws which recognize and give adequate protection to inventions made by the na-
tionals of the other States parties to this Convention.
The Chicago Convention appears to be broader than both 35 U.S.C. § 272 and Article 5ter of
the Paris Convention by precluding from patent infringement the "storage of spare parts and
spare equipment for the aircraft" in the domestic country. CHIsUM, supra note 42, § 16.05[4]
n.12; cf 35 U.S.C. § 272; Paris Convention, supra note 47, art. 5ter. In Cali v. Japan Airlines,
Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), the Eastern District of New York rejected plaintiff's
argument that Section 272 was invalid because it repealed or narrowed the scope of the Chi-
cago Convention. Id. at 1124. The court did not consider whether the Chicago Convention, if
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Convention-and the national statutes of the majority of signatory coun-
tries that have codified that article-shields from infringement liability a
much broader scope of activities than just the installation of patented
repair parts. The use of patented devices in the "construction" of aircraft
and land vehicles could be interpreted to grant a manufacturing excep-
tion for makers of aircraft and land vehicles, as long as "foreign
conveyances" are constructed. Arguably, the exception permits the unau-
thorized construction of aircraft for foreign countries and nationals.
Perhaps noting the broad implications of the "construction" language, a
minority of domestic statutes that provide for differential conveyance
treatment have abandoned this language.57 Instead, these nations grant an
exception only for spare parts and repairs of aircraft.58 This codification,
which does not permit the unauthorized construction of foreign convey-
ances, hues more closely to the purpose of the Chicago Convention but
deviates from the language of the Paris Convention. The full implication
of this "construction" language is discussed more thoroughly in Part IV,
infra.
There is a second, smaller group of countries, including the United
States, which has -codified the temporary presence exception in a manner
that differs from the language of the Paris Convention. 9 These domestic
statutes completely eliminate the "construction" language found in Arti-
cle 5ter(2) of the Paris Convention and provide identical rights to all
types of conveyances. 6° The United States' decision to alter the language
of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention stems from the country's history
with the exception, and the purposes behind it. To illuminate the policy
rationale behind the United States' alteration of the Paris Convention
language, a brief history and description of the codification of the tem-
porary presence exception in the United States is provided herein.
The U.S. Congress codified the temporary presence exception
twenty-seven years after the exception was added to the Paris Conven-
found to be broader than Section 272 and the Paris Convention, is self-implementing. Id. at
1127.
57. See, e.g., Lov om patenter [Patents Act], Act No. 9 of Dec. 15, 1967, as last
amended by Act No. 104 of Dec. 20, 1996, § 5 (Nor.) (spare parts and accessories for aircraft
only); Ustawa o Wynalazczosci [Law on Inventive Activity], Oct. 19, 1972, as amended by the
Law of Apr. 16, 1993, art. 16(5) (Pol.) (spare parts for all conveyances); Loi ffdrrale sur les
brevets d'invention [LBI] [Federal Law on Patents for Inventions], June 25, 1954, as last
amended on Mar. 24, 1995, RS 232.14, art. 35, 3 (Switz.) (equipment for vehicles); Patents
Act, 1977, c. 37, § 60 (U.K.) (spare parts for aircraft).
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000); The Industrial Property Act, (2001) Cap. 3
§ 58(3) (Kenya).
60. Id.
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tion.6 ' The resulting statute, 35 U.S.C. § 272, was passed as part of the
Patent Act of 1952 and reflected both the United States' obligations un-
der Article 5ter of the Paris Convention 62 and the Supreme Court's
holding in Brown.63 Section 272 provides:
The use of any invention in any vessel, aircraft or vehicle of any
country which affords similar privileges to vessels, aircraft or
vehicles of the United States, entering the United States tempo-
rarily or accidentally, shall not constitute infringement of any
patent, if the invention is used exclusively for the needs of the
vessel, aircraft or vehicle and is not offered for sale or sold in or
used for the manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported
from the United States.64
Superficially at least, Section 272 appears to be more limited than
the exceptions in Brown and the Paris Convention, because sales and
offers for sales are explicitly excluded from protection under Section
272.65 It is doubtful, however, that the explicit exclusion of sales and of-
fers of sales from Section 272 actually altered the law in any meaningful
way. Sales and offers for sales are included in the current U.S. patent act
66as infringing acts, and Article 5ter exempts from infringement only the
"use" of "devices forming the subject of the patent," not the sale of those
devices in the United States.67
61. See S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 9, 28 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2402, 2422. The Paris Convention, without accompanying statutory authority, has no force of
law because it is not self-executing. In re Rath, 402 E3d 1207, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (cit-
ing Kawai v. Metlestics, 480 F.2d 880, 884 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000); see also, LADAS, supra note 44, at 246.
63. See S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 28 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2422
("This section follows the requirement of the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, to which the United States is a party, and also codifies the holding of the
Supreme Court that use of a patented invention on board a foreign ship does not infringe a
patent.").
64. 35 U.S.C. § 272. The current version of Section 272 has been amended once, in
1994, as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809,
4989 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 272). The Uruguay Round Agreements amended the
definition of patent infringement to include offers for sale. See S. REP. No. 103-412, at 511
(1994). Section 272 was thus amended to reflect this change: namely, the phrase "not offered
for sale or sold" replaced the former phrase of "not sold" in the statute. Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, 108 Stat. at 4989; S. REP. No. 103-412, at 512.
65. Compare Paris Convention, supra note 47, art. 5ter (excluding from infringement
"the use" of patented devices), and Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 198 (1857)
(excluding "the use of such improvement, in the construction, fitting out, or equipment" of a
vessel), with 35 U.S.C. § 272 (listing "sales and offers for sales" as actions that constitute
patent infringement).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2000).
67. Paris Convention, supra note 47, art. 5ter.
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Section 272 does not follow the Paris Convention's language in one
important aspect. Whereas the Paris Convention grants a "construction"
exception for aircraft, Section 272 does not differentiate between con-
veyance types and does not grant any sort of exception for
"construction" of conveyances. There is no discussion in the legislative
history of the motivation behind Congress' decision to diverge from the
language of the Paris Convention. However, it is likely that Congress felt
that the exception in Brown, which had been good law for nearly 100
years, was sufficient and therefore, it was not necessary to alter the state
of the law. Notably, Congress does not appear to have taken into account
the United States' obligations under the Chicago Convention when pass-
ing Section 272.68 Thus, it appears that Congress was more interested in
statutorily adopting the holding in Brown than in following the contours
of the exception as found in the Paris Convention or its obligations under
the Chicago Convention.
The legislative history of Section 272 is sparse,69 perhaps indicating
that Congress believed the exception to be a narrow one.7" Whatever
Congress's belief as to the scope of the exception, it seems that state-
ments characterizing the exception as of "relatively little importance"
were accurate, as the exception was not litigated in U.S. courts until
1974.7
Other than the two slight variations discussed above, Section 272 has
the same requirements as Article 5ter of the Paris Convention. Like the
Paris Convention, Section 272 contains a reciprocity provision. The stat-
ute also retains the Paris Convention's ambiguity regarding the method
of determining conveyance nationality. Indeed, most countries that have
codified Article 5ter have not addressed the nationality issue. However, a
few countries have adopted a standard for determining conveyance na-
tionality.72 These domestic statutes-including those in India, New
Zealand, and South Africa 73-explicitly state that a conveyance's country
of registry is its country of nationality for purposes of the temporary
68. See supra note 63.
69. See Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2004) ("Nat'l Steel Car I") (describing the legislative history as "brief, noting only that sec-
tion 272 was drafted to codify the Supreme Court's holding in Brown ... and to satisfy the
obligations of the United States under the Paris Convention").
70. In fact, in one of the two pieces of legislative history, Section 272 is described as
being "of relatively little importance." S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 8 (1952), as reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402.
71. S. REP. No. 82-1979 at 29 (1952).
72. See, e.g., Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970; India Code (1999), v. 49; The Patents Act,
1953, 79 (N.Z.); Patents Act 57 of 1978 s. 71(2) (S. Afr.).
73. See id.
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presence exception. This method of determining nationality may conflict
with international law and is addressed more fully in Part III, infra.
2. The Scope of the Exception: Domestic Cases
The temporary presence exception has been infrequently litigated
following its adoption in the Paris Convention and subsequent codifica-
tion by member-states. Strikingly, all the cases that have dealt with the
exception have broadly interpreted the exception's scope. The first case
to address the scope of the temporary presence exception was in the
United States in Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc.4 Cali, the holder of a patent
related to a modification of JT-4 jet engines, accused three major interna-
tional air carriers of infringement: Japan Airlines, KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines, and Scandinavian Airlines.75 Cali argued that the airlines could
not claim protection under 35 U.S.C. § 272 because their activities
within the United States were "regular and systematic," and that to the
extent Section 272 exempted such activities, the statute represented an
76
unconstitutional taking of Cali's property.
The Eastern District of New York disagreed with Cali. The court first
dispensed of Cali's constitutional claim by noting that the Constitution's
patent clause is "not self-executing," as it only "empowers but does not
command Congress to grant patent rights."" As to the limits on tempo-
rality, the court began by examining the roots of the exception in Brown.
The court shared the Brown Court's concern that unlimited private patent
rights would threaten the treaty-making power of the federal government
and its ability to regulate international commerce. 78 However, the Cali
Court ignored Brown's emphasis on the lack of damages to the patent
holder. Cali held that the exception covered more than just "trivial
uses."79 Clear congressional intent, the court reasoned, demonstrated that
the exception was meant to have a broad scope; thus, the exception
should apply even in instances when a patent holder stands to suffer sig-
nificant monetary loss from the unenforceability of his patent rights.80
Thus, the court found that for purpose of Section 272 "temporarily" in-
cluded all instances when a conveyance "enters for the purposes of
completing a voyage, turns about, and continues or commences a new
74. Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). For a more detailed
account of the history of the temporary presence exception in the United States, see Ted L.
Field, The "Planes, Trains, and Automobiles" Defense to Patent Infringement For Today's
Global Economy: Section 272 of the Patent Act, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 26 (2006).
75. Cali, 380 E Supp. at 1122.
76. Id. at 1123-24.
77. Id. at 1124.
78. Id. at 1125-26.
79. Id. at 1126.
80. Id.
Fall 20081
18 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Low Review
voyage."'" This broad definition of "temporarily" permitted the defendant
airlines, and presumably all other airlines using vehicles "of other coun-
tries," to make use of patented inventions without fear of patent
infringement in the United States.
Interestingly, the Cali Court, which analyzed Section 272 with re-
spect to aircraft, did not reveal how it determined the aircraft's
nationality. The court found, in a conclusory fashion, that "[lthe defen-
dant aircraft are 'aircraft of other countries,' and are 'aircraft of' their
respective national states;" yet, the court did not outline what factors
were considered in reaching such a conclusion." The court read Cali's
complaint to stipulate that the vehicles met the reciprocity requirement
of Section 272: "It does not quite appear to be argued that the defendants
and their aircraft are not 'of' foreign countries or national states within
the potential scope of Section 272 and Articles 5ter . .. .,s" Thus, the is-
sue of conveyance nationality under the temporary presence exception
remained unresolved.
The scope of the exception as it applied to boats was the subject of a
2003 case in England. In Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd., an
English court of appeal reached a conclusion regarding the scope of the
exception similar to that reached in Cali: namely, that "temporarily"
covered prolonged and frequent entrances into a foreign country.8 Stena
Rederi involved a company called Irish Ferries that owned a ferry named
the Jonathan Swift that operated between Dublin, Ireland and Holyhead,
England. Stena was the exclusive licensee of a European Patent85 entitled
"Superstructure for Multihull Vessels" that described a catamaran with a
86
superstructure containing two hulls joined by a cargo deck. The Jona-
than Swift was registered in Ireland and journeyed between Ireland and
England three times per day. When traveling to England, the ferry typi-
cally remained in English waters for around three hours."'
The court of appeal determined that although the Jonathan Swift lit-
erally infringed Stena's patent, the English temporary presence
exception-Section 60(5)(d) of the Patents Act of 1977-provided Irish
Ferries with a valid defense.89 The court of appeal relied on the reasoning
in Cali to conclude that the Jonathan Swift was "temporarily" in English
81. Id.
82. See id. at 1122.
83. Id. at 1127.
84. Stena Rederi Aktiebolga v. Irish Ferries Ltd., (2003) EWCA (Civ.) 66 (Eng.).
85. European Patent No. 0,648,173 (filed June 30, 1993).
86. Stena Rederi, EWCA (Civ.) 66 at 4.
87. Id. at 13.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 38.
[Vol. 15:1
Hiding Behind Nationality
waters, even though it made regular entries into the country.90 This broad
reading of "temporarily" was also supported, in the court's view, by
Rolltrailer, a German case. 9' The court of appeals felt that the German
court's reasoning was convincing, even though Rolltrailer interpreted a
92
temporary presence exception that preceded the Paris Convention. The
court in Stena Rederi did not directly address the nationality of the Jona-
than Swift, but seemed to adopt the lower court's finding that the ferry
was Irish. Indeed, as the craft's home port and registration were in Ire-
land, it is unlikely that the nationality of the ferry was challenged.
Shortly after the Stena Rederi decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, the circuit charged with adjudicating all appeals
arising under the patent laws, first addressed the scope of the temporary
presence exception in 2004. 9' In National Steel Car /,94 Canadian Pacific
Railway (CPR) appealed the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's grant of
a preliminary injunction prohibiting CPR's use of a patented railcar. The
patent, which issued in the United States but not in Canada, covered a
type of railcar specifically designed to haul lumber.9 CPR intended to
use the railcars to haul lumber from Canada to the United States and
then return to Canada, typically without cargo.96 CPR argued that Section
272 provided an exception from infringement while in the United States.
The district court disagreed and granted a preliminary injunction.9 7 The
district court found that CPR had failed to meet four requirements of
Section 272: the railcars were not vehicles of "another country,"' 98 they
90. Id. at 72-73.
91. LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, 703 (ER.G.) (holding that Finnish roll
trailers used to unload cargo from a German ship while docked in Germany did not infringe a
German patent because the devices were "foreign vehicles").
92. Id.
93. Aside from Cali and Nat'l Steel Car, there has been only one other published case
analyzing the extent of Section 272. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197
(1993), involved a spacecraft launched by the United States which made use of a patented
apparatus for "controlling the attitude of a spin-stabilized spacecraft." Id. at 201. Among the
arguments presented by the United States favoring non-infringement was the contention that
Section 272 provided complete immunity for patent infringement for importation of the
spacecraft from another country for launch in the United States because the spacecraft was
only temporarily on U.S. soil. The court agreed, holding that spacecraft launched after 1981
were excluded from Section 272 under an amendment specifically excluding spacecraft from
coverage. Spacecraft launched prior to 1981 were considered temporarily in the United States,
and were otherwise covered under Section 272. Id. at 229. For a more complete treatment of
this case, see Field, supra note 74, at 50.
94. Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2004) ("Nat'l Steel Car IM').
95. Id. at 1322.
96. Id. at 1323-24 (noting that "cars return to Canada empty 99.2 percent of the time").
97. Id. at 1324.
98. Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 254 F. Supp. 2d 527, 556 (E.D. Pa.
2003) ("Nat'l Steel Car r").
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were not temporarily in the United States," the patented aspect of the
vehicles was not used exclusively for the needs of the vehicle,' °° and the
patented invention was sold or offered for sale in the United States.'0 '
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, holding that Section 272 did protect CPR from the
infringement claim. In so doing, the Federal Circuit held that "temporar-
ily," as used in Section 272, was not limited to vehicle entries of short
duration or infrequent occurrence. 12 Rather, the court held that for an
entrance into the United States to qualify as temporary, there need only
be a finite duration to the entrance (i.e., the entrance is not permanent)
and the "sole purpose" of the entrance must be to engage in international
commerce.' 3 For support of its purposive interpretation of the exception,
the Federal Circuit looked to the legislative history of Section 272. De-
termining that Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention evidenced
a concern with excessive impediments on international commerce, the
court held that vessels engaged in international commerce were exempt
from patent infringement under Section 272 regardless of the length of
their stay in a foreign 04
While the Federal Circuit's decision in National Steel Car estab-
lished which entries of foreign vessels are temporarily within the United
States and thus eligible to receive exemption from the patent laws under
Section 272, the decision did not clarify which vehicles qualify for the
exception as being "of another country." The district court, however,
reached the nationality issue and found that the railcars were not "of an-
other country."'0 5 Although this finding was subsequently reversed by the
Federal Circuit,' 6 it is instructive to examine the district court's reason-
ing on this issue.
CPR used its own locomotives to haul lumber from Canada into the
United States. At some point after entering the United States, the railcars
were transferred to locomotives owned and operated by U.S. companies.
The district court found that as long as the railcars were being pulled by
99. Id.
100. Id. at 557. The district court found that the "vehicle:' for purposes of Section 272,
was not the railcar but rather the locomotive that pulled the railcars. Id. at 556. The Federal
Circuit reversed this finding on appeal. Nat'l Steel Car I!, 357 F.3d at 1328-29.
101. Nat'l Steel Car l, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 557. This portion of the district court's opinion
has been redacted. The Federal Circuit commented on the redacted portion of the opinion in
Nat'l Steel Car II, 357 F.3d. at 1333.
102. Nat'l Steel Car !!, 357 E3d at 1331.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1329-30. The court also noted that the Cali decision lent persuasive authority
to a purposive reading of "temporarily" that did not rely on the duration of the entry at issue.
Id. at 1330-31.
105. Nat'l Steel Car l, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (emphasis added).
106. See Nat'l Steel Car I, 357 F.3d at 1328-29.
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a CPR locomotive, the "accused railcars [were] part of a vehicle of an-
other country;" namely, Canada.0 7 However, "[d]uring the time the
accused rail cars are part of trains powered by locomotives owned and
operated by United States companies, the accused rail cars are not used
in a vehicle of another country."'0 8 The district court focused on vehicle
ownership as proxy for nationality. Thus, it appears that the district court
believed that the vehicle must be owned by a foreign corporation or citi-
zen to qualify as a vehicle of "another country" for purposes of Section
272.
Because the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's definition of
"vehicle," it did not directly address the nationality issue. However, the
Federal Circuit did indicate factors that may influence conveyance na-
tionality, albeit in dicta. While not explaining its methodology, the
Federal Circuit determined that the railcars were Canadian, regardless of
which country they were in or which locomotive was powering them.,09
It could be argued that the Federal Circuit's ruling seems to implicitly
adopt the trial court's nationality-by-owner determination. In a footnote,
the court stated that "[n]either the district court opinion below nor NSC's
argument on appeal proposes that, if the railcars are vehicles of Canada,
CPR is not in relevant part a Canadian corporation or that Canada does
not afford similar privileges to United States vehicles as required by the
reciprocity provision in section 272* ""o
Further support for the Federal Circuit's implicit adoption of the dis-
trict court's nationality link between owner and vehicle can be found in
the court's opinion. The court addressed, in dictum, what would happen
if CPR engaged in a sale-leaseback arrangement. As of the time of the
National Steel Car II decision, CPR had not determined the ownership
scheme under which the rail cars would be purchased. One option con-
sidered by CPR was to purchase the cars and then sell them to an
American corporation who would then lease the cars back to CPR."' The
Federal Circuit noted that such an arrangement might take the rail cars
outside of Section 272's protection because of the prohibition on the sale
of an invention." 2 Furthermore, the court surmised that a sale-leaseback
agreement "might transform the rail car into a vehicle of the United
States.""' 3 Such a transformation would only be possible if the Federal
107. Nat'l Steel Car 1, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
108. Id.
109. Nat'l Steel Car 1t, 357 F.3d at 1328 (holding that CPR "may be a foreign vehicle"
for the purposes of Section 272).
110. Id. at 1328 n.10.
Ill. Id. at 1334.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Circuit believed, as the district court implicitly held, that the nationality
of the rail car depended upon the nationality of its owner.
The Federal Circuit also described what it found to be the purpose
behind Congress' enactment of the temporary presence exception:
Congress intended to join an international movement to place
foreign-owned means of international transport beyond the reach
of domestic patentees' exclusive rights because the cost of com-
plying with multiple, inconsistent rights of exclusion provided
by the patent regimes of a large number of countries would
likely place an excessive drag on international commerce.'14
The court's focus on reducing international shipping costs is similar to
the English Parliament's concern that led it to statutorily overrule Cald-
well.
D. The Purpose of the Exception
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, the structure and re-
quirements of the temporary presence exception have undergone changes
as the exception has journeyed from legal argument to international
treaty provision. However, it is possible to identify the key policies be-
hind the exception's adoption and the basis for the exception's current
status under international law.
The exception was initially adopted in England in response to a
chancery court decision that a Dutch ship entering English ports was
subject to English patent laws."5 The English statute applied to any
docking of a foreign ship within an English port, regardless of the length
or frequency of its stay. By reciprocally respecting the nationality of for-
eign ships, the statute allowed shippers to concern themselves with only
the patent laws of their home country, and not those of every nation into
which they enter. This reduced transport costs in two ways: by reducing
the extent of patent searches and by eliminating the need to obtain li-
censes to avoid infringement in foreign countries.
The reduced patent informational burden on international shippers
resulting from Article 5ter of the Paris Convention has been noted by
114. Id. at 1330. The international community has amended the Paris Convention only
with respect to the international shipping industry. As a policy matter, one may wonder why
the international shipping industry should be shielded from the high informational cost of
understanding hundreds of national patent systems, while other industries that operate in the
international arena, such as producers of international goods or internet service providers, are
forced to grapple with the variations among domestic patent laws. Whether the exception
should be extended to benefit other industries-or repealed altogether-is a question that is
outside the scope of this Article.
115. See supra Part I.B.
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commentators as well. One commentator noted that a major concern of
the adoption of the exception was to protect shippers "who may be alto-
gether ignorant of the grant of a patent in a country," from risk of
property seizure.' 6 Reducing the cost of patent searches reduces the
transaction cost of international shipping worldwide, as all major nations
enjoy reciprocity for their ships.
Similarly, courts in the United States have found that the reduced in-
formational burden that the temporary presence exception provides for
shippers is the main policy objective of the exception. ' 7 Courts in other
countries have similarly emphasized the temporary presence exception's
purpose of reducing costs for the transportation industry by reducing the
number of patent licenses required to engage in international com-
118
merce.
Aside from reducing costs for shippers, the other principal objective
of the temporary presence exception is the maintenance of harmonious
international relations. The United States Supreme Court in Brown felt that
granting patentees the right to detain foreign conveyances would unconsti-
tutionally bestow part of the treaty-making power of the federal
government on individual citizens.' 9 Since the amendment of the Paris
Convention, other courts interpreting the temporary presence exception
have also noted this important policy goal. For instance, the Eastern Dis-
trict Court of New York stated that, "the patent law must not be so
interpreted as to impair the treaty-making capacity of the nation or to clog
its power to regulate foreign commerce (since that would make patent
grants a surrender pro tanto of 'sovereignty' to private persons... ).",o
The application of the exception by various courts around the world
has furthered both of the exception's primary goals. The broad interpre-
tation of temporality by the English Court of Appeal and the U.S.
Federal Circuit, among others, greatly reduces the liability and informa-
tion costs associated with international commerce. Conveyances that
are engaged in international commerce can rely on the temporary pres-
ence exception to shield them from infringement liability on all patents
issued in every country other than their home country. This reduction in
global patent liability concomitantly reduces the legal cost of ensuring
116. LADAS, supra note 44, at 246.
117. See supra Part I.C.2.
118. Schlumberger Logelco, Inc. v. Coflexip S A 2000 (3) SA 861 (SCA) at 863 (S. Afr.)
(noting that the effect of the temporary presence exception is that conveyance owners "are not
required to obtain licenses on patents in force in [foreign] countries in order to avoid infring-
ing such patents") (quoting GEORG HENDRIK CHRISTIAAN BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO
APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 82
(1967)).
119. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 197 (1856).
120. Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 E Supp 1120, 1125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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compliance with patent systems worldwide. Through the temporary
presence exception, commercial enterprises can focus exclusively on the
local patent system and the patents granted therein, assured that liability
is limited to those patents. This reduced cost of doing business for com-
panies involved in international trade was much of the driving force
behind the international adoption of the temporary presence exception.
However, there is a potential downside to the exception as well. The
modern international legal structure for determining conveyance nation-
ality allows owners to select their conveyance's nationality. Nationality
selection paired with the temporary presence exception allows convey-
ance owners to avoid patent infringement liability in every single
country. Neither courts nor commentators have addressed this loophole
in the international patent system. The next section will describe the in-
ternational law of conveyance nationality that creates this loophole.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW: DETERMINING CONVEYANCE NATIONALITY
As described above, most nations that have adopted the temporary
presence exception have not defined the manner in which conveyance
nationality is determined, nor have domestic courts addressed the na-
tionality question when interpreting the exception. A few countries have
statutorily defined nationality with respect to the exception, but most are
silent on the issue.' 2' Courts that have interpreted the statute thus far have
either presumed nationality based on ownership, or found the nationality
of the conveyances to be undisputed. 22 Because neither the Paris Con-
vention nor domestic laws have settled the nationality issue, courts faced
with cases involving the temporary presence exception turn to interna-
tional law for nationality determinations.
2
1
121. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
122. See supra Part I.C.2.
123. Superficially, it seems appealing for courts to adopt a simpler rubric to determine
reciprocity: instead of determining vessel nationality, a court might simply determine that a
vessel is "foreign" and from a country that has signed the Paris Convention. Doing so would
seem to alleviate the difficulty described in this Article in determining vessel nationality, while
still upholding the reciprocity requirement. However, this approach would still encounter the
same difficulties that are encountered in determining a specific nationality for vessels. A "for-
eignness" determination requires the evaluating body to determine that a vessel is not
nationalized in the country in which it is located. To do this, the evaluating body must deter-
mine where the vessel is nationalized in order to make such a "foreignness" determination.
Furthermore, a mere analysis of "foreignness" does not reduce the opportunities for transport-
ers to avoid patent infringement. In fact, under such a broad reciprocity scheme, vessel owners
could receive even broader liability immunity because they would only need to prove foreign-
ness in every country into which they enter.
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International law requires that vessels (boats, ships, and other ocean-
going conveyances) and aircraft have a particular nationality. However,
the international regimes for obtaining nationality differ between vessels
and aircraft. International law does not determine the nationality of vehi-
cles (automobiles, trains, and other land-based conveyance). This section
will describe the international system of nationalization that applies to
the three types of conveyances enumerated in the temporary presence
exception: vessels, aircraft, and vehicles.
A. Vessels
Article 5ter of the Paris Convention grants an exception from in-
fringement for patented devices used "in the body of the vessel, in the
machinery, tackle, gear and other accessories."14 International maritime
law, unlike most domestic laws,'25 provides a method for determining the
nationality of foreign vessels. International law requires that all naviga-
ble vessels have a nationality and fly the flag of that nation. 2 6 The
nationality of a vessel is determined by the flag under which that vessel
sails. Thus, even if a vessel's home port is in a country other than the
flag country, it is considered a national of the flag country. ' Under this
"law of the flag," each country determines the conditions on which to
124. Paris Convention, supra note 47, art. 5ter(l).
125. As an example of the lack of a statutory scheme for determining foreign vessel
nationality, the United States' current statutory codification of the exception provides protec-
tion against infringement liability for "vessels," as well as for "aircraft," and "vehicles." The
term vessel is broadly defined in the U.S. Code to include "every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water." See I U.S.C. § 3 (2008). Thus, any means of water transport entering the United States
for purposes of international commerce is eligible for protection under the temporary presence
exception, as long as it meets the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 272, including, inter alia, the
reciprocity requirement. To determine whether Section 272's reciprocity requirement has been
met, a court must determine the vessel's nationality in order to determine whether the vessel's
home country provides similar protection from infringement to vessels of the United States.
Section 272 does not define how nationality of a vessel is to be determined, nor does the U.S.
Code. "Foreign vessel" was formerly defined as "a vessel of foreign registry or operated under
the authority of a country except the United States." 46 U.S.C. § 2101(12) (2000). However,
that definition was deleted on October 6, 2006. Even using this definition, however, vessel
nationality would have to be determined in any inquiry involving Section 272's applicability.
Simply finding that a vessel is foreign is not sufficient to determine whether the vessel's home
nation provides reciprocity to U.S. vessels.
126. Jessica K. Ferrell, Controlling Flags of Convenience: One Measure To Stop Over-
fishing of Collapsing Fish Stocks, 35 ENVTL. L. 323, 333 (2005); Sompong Sucharitkil,
Liability and Responsibility of the State of Registration or the Flag State in Respect of Sea-
Going Vessels, Aircraft and Spacecraft Registered by National Registration Authorities, 54
AM. J. COMP. L. 409, 411 (2006).
127. See, e.g., Sclumberger Logelco, Inc. v. Coflexip S A 2000 (3) SA 861 (SCA) at 865
(S. Aft.) (noting that a vessel carrying a South African flag is a South African vessel, even if
its home port is elsewhere).
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grant its nationality to a vessel.'28 The flag under which a ship sails de-
termines the laws governing the vessel's operations while on the high
seas. 2 9 A ship on the high seas is assimilated into the territory of the state
under whose flag it flies. In essence, a ship is considered part of the na-
tional territory of the country whose flag it flies and the duty to exercise
control and jurisdiction over vessels is posited solely in that country. In-
ternational law generally prohibits ships from having dual-citizenship.'3°
The nationality of a particular vessel is of supreme economic impor-
tance to a ship owner because it controls numerous aspects that affect
profitability.'3 ' To obtain nationality in a particular country, a ship must
seek and obtain registration in that country. The country of registration
governs many elements that are of vital importance to ship owners, in-
cluding labor laws, taxation, and environmental controls.' 2 There must
be a "genuine link" between the ship and the registering country, but the
linkage requirement is not strictly enforced in every nation. 3' The valid-
ity of a particular ship's registration and the linkage between the ship
and the registering country can be questioned only by the registering
state.1
34
Two distinct types of ship registries exist: traditional registries and
open registries.'33 Traditional registries impose strict linkage require-
ments between the flag state and the vessel. 36 These registries typically
require that some percentage of the owners or the crew of the vessel be
citizens of the granting nation. 37 Some traditional registries impose fur-
ther citizenship requirements on the management or ownership of the
corporation that owns the vessel.' 38 For example, the United States is a
traditional registry country and maintains a strict nationality requirement
for vessel registration. Only U.S. citizens, trusts and partnerships com-
posed exclusively of U.S. citizens, or U.S. corporations that have a
128. BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STUDY 93-94 (1962).
129. See Alexander J. Marcopoulos, Comment, Flags of Terror: An Argument for Re-
thinking Maritime Security Policy Regarding Flags of Convenience, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 277,
282-83 (2007).
130. See LASSA OPPENHEIM & HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 1 (7th
ed. 1948).
131. MARTIN STOPEORD, MARITIME ECONOMICS 152-53, 156 (2d ed. 1997).
132. Id. at 156.
133. Geneva Convention on the High Seas art. 5(I), Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
134. GEORGE KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION 75 (1993) (stating
that the U.N. treaty designed to strengthen the "genuine link" requirement merely "reaffirmed
the flag state's supremacy and institutionalized the status quo").
135. Id. at 159-60.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 160.
138. Id.
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minimum number of U.S. citizens on its board of directors can register
vessels in the United States.
39
In contrast, open registries are characterized by a general decoupling
between a vessel and its ties to the state of registration.'4 0 Countries with
open registries allow foreign owners to register their vessels. Most open
registries allow complete anonymity of ownership interest through the
use of bearer shares, nominee shareholders, nominee directors, and in-
termediaries.' 4' Nations with open registries compete for the registration
of foreign vessels by reducing the costs and regulations imposed on reg-
istered vessels.'4 2  Ships registered in these so-called "flag of
convenience" states typically enjoy lower taxes, operating expenses, and
costs associated with regulatory compliance. "Flag of convenience"
states have flourished since World War I1,43 and the lowered regulations
and costs associated with registering in these countries has attracted over
60 percent of the world's shipping by tonnage.'" Commentators have
criticized the proliferation of "flag of convenience" nations as a race-to-
the-bottom for international ship regulations.'
4
1
The two largest "flag of convenience" registries are those of Panama
and Liberia. Over 20 percent of the world's vessels take advantage of
Panama's relaxed registration requirements and its light regulatory over-
sight. 46 There is no citizenship requirement to obtain Panamanian
registration nor is there a minimum tonnage requirement.'4 7 Similarly,
Liberia-second only to Panama in number of registered ships-has no
citizenship requirement between the registering country and the home
port of the vessel, the owner's nationality, or the nationality of the ship's
148
crew.
139. 46 U.S.C. § 12103(b) (2000).
140. See J. Bennett Fox, Jr., Vessel Ownership and Terrorism: Requiring Disclosure of
Beneficial Ownership Is Not the Answer, 4 Loy. MAR. L.J. 92, 98 (2005).
141. Id. at 96.
142. See STOPFORD, supra note 131, at 161.
143. BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 280 (Scarecrow
Press 2005); Anastasia Strati, Greek Shipping Interests and the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea, in GREECE AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 255, 258 (Theodore C. Kariotis ed., 1997).
144. Ferrell, supra note 126, at 338.
145. See e.g., Paul S. Dempsey & Lisa L. Helling, Oil Pollution by Ocean Vessels-An
Environmental Tragedy: The Legal Regime of Flags of Convenience, Multilateral Conventions,
and Coastal States, 10 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 37, 40, 51, 86 (1980); William Lange-
weische, Anarchy at Sea, ATL. MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, at 52.
146. Marcopoulus, supra note 129, at 290-91.
147. Id. at 291.
148. Id. at 290.
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B. Aircraft
The exception granted to aircraft in the Paris Convention is arguably
broader than the one granted to vessels. Article 5ter permits the unau-
thorized use of patented devices in the "construction or operation" of
aircraft, or "of accessories of such aircraft."' 49 International law recog-
nizes the right and duty of aircraft to be registered in a particular country
and to adopt the nationality of that country. Thus, as with vessels, courts
interpreting the temporary presence exception will look to the country of
an aircraft's registration to determine nationality. However, unlike inter-
national maritime law in which multinational treaties accord great
deference to a vessel's choice of nationality, aviation law is characterized
by decentralized agreements between individual nations. These agree-
ments typically establish minimum requirements for registration, such as
nationality of ownership. These requirements limit an owner's ability to
select his aircraft's nationality.
The first international agreement to require aircraft nationality was
the Chicago Convention.'5° Article 6 of that treaty stipulates that aircraft
shall take the nationality of the state in which they are registered.'5 ' That
same rule of aircraft nationality exists in various other international trea-
ties. "2 The Chicago Convention fully established the state of registration
as the state of an aircraft's nationality.' The principle of exclusive juris-
diction of the state of nationality applies to aircraft just as it does to
vessels.'5 4 States must ensure that their aircraft comply with the local
rules and regulations in force wherever the aircraft travels, issue certifi-
cates of airworthiness for their aircraft, and provide licenses for the
crews of those aircraft.' While over the high seas, aircraft are treated as
part of their state's national territory.'56 However, all aircraft are subject
149. Paris Convention, supra note 47, art. 5ter(2).
150. Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation art. 6, Oct. 13, 1919, I1
L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. For more on this convention, see I.H.Ph.
Diederiks-Verschoor, Dr J.E Lycklama bt Nijeholt (1876-1947), 19 AIR & SPACE L. 8, 8-14
(1994).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Pan-American International Convention on Commercial Aviation art. 7,
Feb. 20, 1928, 47 U.S.T. 1901; Ibero-American Convention on Air Navigation art. 6, Nov. 1,
1926, (L.O. 1927, 913).
153. Under the Chicago Convention, "Every aircraft engaged in international air naviga-
tion shall bear its appropriate nationality and registration marks." Chicago Convention, supra
note 150, art. 20. The United States complies with this requirement by issuing N-numbers to
all registered aircraft, whether the aircraft are used for international or domestic flights. The
requirements for requesting, obtaining and displaying N-numbers are stated in 14 C.F.R. § 45.
154. Andrew S. Williams, The Interception of Civil Aircraft Over the High Seas in the
Global War on Terror, 59 A.F. L. REv. 73, 96 (2007).
155. Id. at 97.
156. Id.
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to the laws of the state in whose territory they enter for purposes of
safety, security, customs, immigration, and quarantine.'57 They may be
intercepted and boarded for inspection by local officials to ensure com-
pliance with local law.' 8
Thus, just like maritime law, international aviation law looks to the
national registries of individual nations to determine nationality. How-
ever, the registration regimes differ between the two types of
conveyances: domestic aircraft registries do not have international appli-
cation, unlike vessel registries. Instead, aircraft registries are maintained
between the signatories of bilateral agreements.'59 These bilateral agree-
ments establishing nationality are required for planes from the European
Union, which has introduced a registration system for E.U. planes. If a
plane is registered in the European Union, it must have an individual
nationality for purposes of the bilateral agreements that its home country
maintains with other nations. '6°
In addition to establishing the nationality requirement for aircraft,
the Chicago Convention established the right of every country to reserve
to its own carriers air travel between two points within its territory
(known as "cabotage").' 6' The United States, for instance, reserves its
cabotage rights for U.S. air carriers, with exceptions for carriers from
countries that offer reciprocal cabotage rights.6 6 For an aircraft to be reg-
istered in the United States, it must meet strict requirements promulgated
to ensure that U.S. aircraft are, in fact, owned and operated by U.S. citi-
zens. Currently, U.S. law requires that an applicant be a U.S. citizen
before receiving a license to operate as an air carrier. 63 This strict re-
quirement of owner nationality prevents serious foreign investment in
American air carriers, even though U.S. airlines have long been deregu-
lated. Similarly strict ownership requirements are, or may be, imposed
157. Id. at 99.
158. Id.
159. I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 271 (8th ed.
2006). The bilateral agreements that have been entered into since the Chicago Convention
typically refer to nationality of airline, rather than nationality of individual aircraft. See
Romina Polley, 3. Aviation Defense Strategies of National Carriers, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
170, 193 (2000).
160. Polley, supra note 159, at 193-94.
161. Chicago Convention, supra, note 150, art. 7.
162. 49 U.S.C. § 40109(g) (2008).
163. For purposes of U.S. aircraft registration, citizenship includes individual U.S. citi-
zens, partnerships made up entirely of U.S. citizens, or a U.S. corporation of which "the
president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing officers are
citizens of the United States, and in which at least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned or
controlled by persons that are citizens of the United States." 49 U.S.C. § 41102(a)(15) (2008).
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on domestic air carriers in other countries through those countries' bilat-
eral agreements."
Because of international aviation law's reliance on bilateral agree-
ments instead of international treaties, there has not been a proliferation
of "flag of convenience" states for aircraft, unlike vessels. Although all
international aircraft are required to have a nationality, there is no inter-
national agreement that requires that all nations recognize domestic
registration practices. For example, the United States has the power to
ensure that the nationality of an aircraft applying for a permit has a rea-
sonable relationship with the owner of the aircraft. For a foreign-flag air
carrier to permissibly make flights to and from the United States, the
carrier must apply for a permit under Section 402 of the Federal Aviation
Act. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is authorized to issue
permits to foreign aircraft and in doing so evaluates three areas to ensure
compliance with Section 402: (1) public interest, (2) operational and fi-
nancial fitness, and (3) ownership and control of the airline.' 65 DOT has
the authority to examine the ownership and control of an aircraft to en-
sure that it is substantially controlled and effectively managed by
nationals or the government of the country of registration. 6 6 DOT has the
power to withhold a foreign permit from an air carrier owned by U.S.
citizens. Because DOT has discretionary power to grant or withhold for-
eign air carrier permits for aircraft that are in reality owned by American
citizens or corporations, DOT can effectively limit the ability of U.S.
citizens to register their aircraft abroad.
Additionally, bilateral air agreements typically give individual na-
tions the power to accept or reject other countries' registration practices,
thus granting individual nations a type of veto power against the rise of
"flag of convenience" states for aircraft. While obtaining a particular
nationality for an aircraft may be economically beneficial for an aircraft
owner, it is much more difficult as a practical matter to obtain such na-
tionality than it is in the case of vessels. The standard bilateral air
agreement between individual nations contains a clause that grants states
the right to refuse the nationality designation of an air carrier if that air
164. See PAT HANLON, GLOBAL AIRLINES: COMPETITION IN A TRANSNATIONAL INDUS-
TRY 9 (3d ed. 2007).
165. See U.S. Dep't of Transp., Application of Aeroejecutivo for Foreign Air Carrier
Permit, Order 91-10-42, Sept. 16, 1991, 1991 DOT Av. LEXIS 762; U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
Application of Air Europe for Foreign Air Carrier Permits, Order 91-10-22, Sept. 10, 1991,
1991 DOT Av. LEXIS 755; U.S. Dep't of Transp., Eva Airways Corp., Order 91-9-32, Sept.
11, 1991, 1991 DOT Av. LEXIS 648.
166. See Application of Air Europe, supra note 165, at *2. In one DOT decision, the fact
that a U.S. citizen was one of five officers of a foreign airline did not prohibit that airline from
obtaining a U.S. permit. See Application of Aeroejecutivo, supra note 165, at *2.
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carrier is not majority-owned and effectively controlled by nationals of
that state.'67
C. Vehicles
Vehicles are afforded the same exception from patent infringement
that aircraft are afforded under the Paris Convention. Thus, the use of a
patented device in the "construction," "operation," or "accessories" of a
vehicle is permitted while in a foreign country temporarily. Although
vehicles, such as railcars and automobiles, are often registered in indi-
vidual countries, the domestic registration of those vehicles does not
determine nationality under international law. 68 Courts faced with de-
termining the nationality of land vehicles will therefore have no choice
but to look to domestic law to determine nationality. Unfortunately,
many nations do not have such statutory nationality determinations. For
instance, while "vehicles" are well-defined in the U.S. Code, 69 "foreign
vehicles" are not, nor is vehicle nationality generally defined. Faced with
this predicament, courts that have thus far analyzed the issue have
looked to the vehicle owner's nationality as a proxy for vehicle national-
ity.1
70
III. THE PROBLEM: USING TERRITORIALITY AND NATIONALITY TO
AVOID PATENT INFRINGEMENT
The temporary presence exception effectively limits the scope of a
conveyance owner's patent infringement liability to a single country. The
reduced scope of international liability results in reduced costs for the
owner. These reduced costs include reduced patent search costs, reduced
licensing fees, and lower infringement judgment and insurance costs. 7'
The exception maintains the domestic reach of patent law-conveyances
remain bound by their home patent law system-while eliminating the
additional liability associated with conveyances entering foreign nations.
167. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 159, at 76.
168. Id. at 28.
169. I U.S.C. § 4 (2008).
170. See Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1326, 1328
n. 10, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Nat'l Steel Car If").
171. See, e.g., LADAS, supra note 44, at 246 ("The right of the patentee to prevent the use
of his invention in foreign vessels or other means of transportation coming temporarily into
the jurisdiction of a state may cause much inconvenience to the freedom of communication. It
is too rigid to require a foreigner, who may be altogether ignorant of the grant of a patent in a
country, to secure a license from the patentee for the use of the invention at the risk of being
subjected to seizure of the machine or engine employed in the construction, fitting out, or
functioning of his vessel or other means of transportation.").
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The temporary presence exception is a reciprocal exception. Paris
Convention countries agree not to enforce their patents against convey-
ances from other member-countries.12 The reciprocal nature of the
temporary presence exception inherently requires that conveyances have
a designated nationality; nationless conveyances cannot claim protection
under the exception because they do not hail from a country that offers
reciprocal protections. In essence, the exception allows a conveyance
owner to ignore patents issued in all countries, other than the flag coun-
try of the conveyance. It is therefore necessary to determine a
conveyance's nationality in order to determine which country's patent
laws govern the conveyance.
When the temporary presence exception was adopted in 1925, de-
termining the nationality of an airplane or a ship was a fairly simple
matter. Airlines were generally state-owned or, in countries with private
airline ownership, domestic governments exercised great control over
pricing and routes.'73 In the 1920s, ship registries were "closed;" that is,
they were available only to a country's own citizens.' Ships were, there-
fore, clearly nationalized within the country in which their owner was a
citizen. "Flag of convenience" registries had not yet developed and ships
were typically nationalized in their owner's home country.' With the
rise of "flag of convenience" registries, however, conveyance owners are
now able to select their conveyance's flag country.
This section will describe two ways in which owners can select the
nationality of their conveyance in such a way as to completely eliminate
patent infringement liability. This reduction in infringement liability is
available to a degree not contemplated by the framers of the temporary
presence exception. In short, owners can register their conveyances in a
nation of their choice and effectively opt-in to the most favorable patent
system, while opting-out of every other domestic patent system world-
wide. They can do this by either selecting a flag country in which
inventors do not typically obtain patent protection, or a country into
which the particular conveyance never enters. By carefully selecting the
flag country of their conveyance, owners can effectively, if not com-
pletely, eliminate their liability for patent infringement on a global level.
The practice of selecting a flag country in order to reduce operating
costs is well-documented. 7 6 "Flag of convenience" registries thrive pre-
cisely because they allow owners to evade laws, regulations, and taxes to
which they would otherwise be subject if they were forced to register in
172. See Paris Convention, supra note 47, art. 5ter.
173. See HANLON, supra note 164, at 7.
174. BOCZEK, supra note 143.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., id.
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other nations. 77 This creates a race-to-the-bottom in which countries
competing for vessel registrations reduce the regulatory requirements
and taxes on vessels in order to attract foreign registrants.'78 This practice
has been roundly criticized and some steps have been taken on an inter-
national level to address the issue. 1
79
However, the effect of "flag of convenience" registries on interna-
tional patent law has not been addressed by commentators. This is likely
due to a number of reasons. First and foremost, it is unclear whether pat-
ent costs drive the registration decisions of conveyance owners.
Conveyance owners are faced with numerous variables when deciding in
which country to register their conveyance. '8 It may be the case that a
reduction of taxes, salaries, and regulations is more attractive to convey-
ance owners than reduced patent infringement liability. It is also likely
that the true cost savings associated with choosing a particular tax and
regulatory regime over another is more easily calculable than the re-
duced patent search and licensing costs associated with one patent
regime over another. Patentees also face search costs associated with
identifying and locating infringing conveyances and these costs may de-
ter patentees from bringing infringement claims, thereby emboldening
infringers. Lastly, it is not apparent that the international transportation
industry is aware of the possibility of avoiding patent infringement
through conveyance nationality selection.1
81
While the extent to which conveyance owners take patent infringe-
ment considerations into account when selecting a flag country for their
conveyances is undetermined and perhaps negligible, the existence of a
loophole allowing infringement avoidance through nationality selection
is troublesome. Flag country selection provides owners with an excep-
tion from patent infringement that is much broader than the framers of
the temporary presence exception envisioned. The temporary presence
exception was designed to place a conveyance at risk of patent infringe-
ment only in its home country, 82 but this section will demonstrate how
conveyance owners, with the help of "flag of convenience" registries and
177. Id.
178. STOPFORD, supra note 131, at 161.
179. See BOCZEK, supra note 143, at 281-82.
180. See id. at 279-80 (noting that "flag of convenience" registries are used to reduce tax
burdens, regulatory costs, crew salaries, and to avoid compliance with fishing regulations).
181. Cf Federal Circuit's First Review of Section 272 of the Patent Act, Ropes & Gray
LLP News and Publications, Mar. 2004, available at http://www.ropesgray.com/newspubs/
detail.aspx?publication=606 (noting that National Steel Car 11 "need not imply that defen-
dants will successfully rely on Section 272 [temporary presence exception] with any greater
frequency than they have for the past 50 years").
182. See supra Part I.D.
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ownership transfers, can virtually eliminate global patent liability on
their vessels and vehicles.
This section will provide examples of how the intersection of the in-
ternational regime of conveyance registration with the temporary
presence exception creates opportunities to eliminate patent infringe-
ment liability. The examples are grouped into two types of methods for
eliminating patent infringement liability. The first method involves ob-
taining nationality in a country which has either weak patent
enforcement, or few relevant patents. The second method involves ob-
taining nationality in a country into which the conveyance never enters.
Following the examples of liability avoidance, this section will describe
additional considerations in using the temporary presence exception to
avoid infringement liability.
A. Examples of the Problem
Domestic patent systems are not created equally; the subject matter
that is eligible for patent protection differs between nations, ' as do the
requirements for obtaining and enforcing patents." 4 Individual domestic
patent systems also vary considerably in the amount and scope of patents
in force.'85
These differences between domestic patent systems result, in part,
from patentees choosing to obtain patents only in those countries in
which doing so will result in an expected economic benefit. Because
patents can only be enforced in the issuing country, patenting an inven-
tion in a country in which the invention is unlikely to be made, used,
manufactured, or sold does little to protect the economic value of an in-
ventor's intellectual property. Similarly, a potential patentee stands to
benefit little from patenting an invention in a country with weak, or non-
existent patent enforcement mechanisms.8 6 As a practical matter, it is
wasteful to spend the time and money required to obtain a patent in a
183. See, e.g., H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Competition Law and Patent Protection in Japan: A
Half-Century of Progress, a New Millennium of Challenges, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 71 (dis-
cussing the differences between patent-eligible subject matter in Japan, the United States, and
Europe).
184. See, e.g., Adam J. Sedia, Storming the Last Bastion: The Patent Reform Act of 2007
and Its Assault on the Superior First-to-Invent Rule, 18 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. L. 79 (noting that the United States is the only country with the first-to-invent rule for
patenting).
185. See WIPO STATISTICS DATABASE, PATENTS IN FORCE BY PATENT OFFICE AND RE-
PORTING YEAR (2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/
patents/xls/wipo-pat-in-forceby-officetable.xls.
186. See Robert M. Sherwood, Vanda Scartezini & Peter D. Siemsen, Promotion of In-
ventiveness in Developing Countries Through a More Advanced Patent Administration, 39
IDEA 473, 477-78 (1999).
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country in which enforcing that patent would be impractical or impossi-
ble.
In practice, inventors typically patent their inventions only in coun-
tries in which they will likely receive a significant monetary reward in
the case of a favorable infringement judgment, or in cases in which the
threat of such a judgment is sufficient to induce a user to obtain a license
prior to using the patented device.' 7 Patentees often patent only in a few
domestic patent offices in which the need for and ability of enforcement
is greatest. For example, the patent offices of Japan, the United States,
China, South Korea, and the European Union account for over 74 per-
cent of all patent applications worldwide.'" The IP director for Boeing
Corporation estimates that only "30 to 40%" of the company's patents
are prosecuted anywhere other than the United States, and of those that
are most are prosecuted only in the European Union.'89 Rarely do patent-
ees go to the time, effort, and expense of completely globalizing their
patent rights.' 90 This is why a much greater number of patents are in
force in Japan, the United States, the European Union, and other major
industrial nations than in less-developed countries.9
Domestic patent systems also differ by the particular domestic laws
and enforcement mechanisms employed by individual nations. The types
of inventions eligible for patenting differ between nations. 92 Along with
the difference in patent-eligible subject matter among nations, there is a
disparity in the quality and efficiency of judicial enforcement mecha-
nisms. To effectively enforce patent rights, a patentee must be able to
obtain a judicial decree that is enforceable. Many nations lack effective
judicial mechanisms for patent enforcement, thus lowering the value of
patents in those countries and serving as a disincentive to obtain patent
protection in such countries. '93 The temporary presence exception allows
187. See id. at 478 (noting that "in countries with weak intellectual property protection,
inventors have been discouraged from filing patent applications because of the dubious value
of any patent they might obtain").
188. WIPO PATENT REPORT: A STATISTICAL REVIEW (2008 ed.), available at http://
www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/wipo-pub_931 .html#a 12.
189. Ingrid Hering, Taking to the Skies: Ingrid Hering Speaks to James 7ierney, Director
of IP Business, Boeing, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. Nov. 2001, at 64-65.
190. See Michael D. Bednarek, Global Patent Strategy, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Nov.
1994, at 12 ("few individuals or even large companies can afford to protect every invention in
every country.").
191. See WIPO PATENT REPORT, supra note 188.
192. Harris, supra note 183. TRIPS grants nations the right to exclude from patentability
applications involving certain subject matter, including patent applications for medical proce-
dures, inventions involving plant or animal material, and business methods. See TRIPS, supra
note 4.
193. See Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Prop-
erty Protection in Developing Countries, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 75, 77-83 (1990) (finding that
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patent users to exploit this patchwork of domestic patent rights in order
to avoid patent liability globally in two ways: by registering a vessel in a
country with a weak patent system, or by employing a sale/leaseback
agreement with a foreign corporation.
1. "Flag of Convenience" Registries
One method for avoiding global patent infringement liability by us-
ing the temporary presence exception is to take advantage of "flag of
convenience" registries. This can be done by registering in countries into
which a vessel never enters or by registering in a country with a weak
patent system. For purposes of this example, a weak patent system refers
to systems in which judicial enforcement of patent rights is ineffective or
in which the scope of patents is less than robust.
As an example, recall the facts of the Stena Rederi case.' 94 In that
case, an Irish ferry made daily journeys between the United Kingdom
and Ireland. The hull design was patented in the United Kingdom, but
not in Ireland. That decision-to patent in one country and not the
other-ultimately meant that the patentee was unable to enforce his pat-
ent against the ferry, as it was an Irish ferry and therefore subject only to
patents in effect in Ireland.
Suppose, however, that the patentee had obtained a patent of his hull
design invention in both Ireland and the United Kingdom. In that case,
the ferry would not be subject to patent infringement in the United
Kingdom, but would be in Ireland. The court in the Stena Rederi case
noted this possibility by noting that, "the Jonathan Swift would not be
immune from suit in Dublin, its home port."' 95 The court assumed that if
the patentee had merely obtained his patent in the neighboring nation of
Ireland, the temporary presence exception would not have provided any
protection for the alleged infringer. 1
9 6
But this assumption is incorrect for two reasons. First, the ferry
could have obtained nationality in a country, such as Panama, into which
it would never enter.'97 In that case, even if the patentee obtained a patent
in both Ireland and England (the two countries between which the Jona-
than Swift traveled) he would not be able to enforce his patent against a
Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe have strong but poorly enforced intellectual property
laws).
194. Stena Rederi Aktiebolga v. Irish Ferries Ltd., (2003) EWCA (Civ.) 66 (Eng.).
195. ld. at 77.
196. The court stated that being subject to infringement in Ireland disproved the pat-
entee's argument "that the ship could not infringe anywhere (other than the point of
construction)" Id.
197. Panama has been a member of the "Paris Union" since October 19, 1996. WIPO,
Paris Notification 174, Accession by the Republic of Panama, July 19, 1996, available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/pafis/treaty-paris_174.html.
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Panamanian vessel. The court's incorrect belief that simply obtaining a
patent in Ireland would have protected the patentee's rights stemmed
from the court's misinterpretation of how to determine the Jonathan
Swift's nationality. The court stated that "[a] vehicle which returns to its
operational home may not be treated the same way as one which tempo-
rarily visits foreign lands."'98 According to international law, however, a
vessel's "operational home" does not influence, much less determine, the
vessel's nationality.'" Instead, the country of registration determines na-
tionality.20 Therefore, if the Jonathan Swift had been registered in
Panama-which is permissible under both Panamanian and international
law-there would be no risk in using the patented design without a li-
cense in England and Ireland. This would be true in any country into
which the Jonathan Swift entered, except for Panama.
Alternatively, the patentee could have avoided liability by selecting a
nation in which the patentee had declined to patent his invention, or in
which patent protection is weak. For example, if the patentee had chosen
not to obtain patent protection in Liberia, the ferry owner could have
registered in that country, thereby obtaining Liberian nationality. There-
after, the Jonathan Swift would only be subject to patent infringement in
Liberia. Since the inventor had not patented his invention in Liberia, the
ferry would have been immune from patent infringement on the patented
hull design in every country. Of course, this scenario assumes significant
foresight on the part of the user of the patented device. Such foresight
would involve extensive knowledge of patents and patent law.
Under either the Liberia or Panama scenarios above, the patentee
would be unable to enforce his patent against the Jonathan Swift. The
Panama scenario creates unenforceable patent rights even if the patentee
had gone to the expense of patenting his invention in every country
worldwide. °' Clearly, this level of patent infringement immunity is be-
yond the scope contemplated by the framers of the temporary presence
exception.2 2 The framers of the exception did not contemplate global
patent infringement avoidance using the temporary presence exception,
nor could they have contemplated such avoidance since the ability to
obtain nationality separate from a vessel's operational home did not arise
for many years after the adoption of the exception.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. See supra Part II.A.
200. See id.
201. This is subject to the caveat that once on the high seas, the vessel would be subject to
the patent laws of the flag country. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. Thus, the vessel
would only be liable for infringement when in Panamanian waters, or when on the high seas.
202. See supra Part I.D.
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2. Sale/Leaseback Agreements
The previous example dealt with using "flag of convenience" regis-
tries in combination with the temporary presence exception in order to
avoid global patent infringement liability. That method of infringement
immunity is only available to vessels, because such registries do not ex-
ist for land vehicles or aircraft. However, land vehicles may be able to
use the temporary presence exception to avoid patent infringement liabil-
ity globally in a different manner.
To demonstrate this possibility, recall the National Steel Car case. In
that case, CPR had not finalized the ownership status of its allegedly in-
fringing railcars; CPR was contemplating financing its purchase of the
railcars through a sale-leaseback arrangement. Under this arrangement,
CPR (a Canadian corporation) would sell the railcars to a leasing com-
pany (located in the United States) which would then lease the cars back
to CPR through a capital or operating lease.'°4
The modern rail industry often utilizes sale-leaseback agreements in
order to finance the purchase of railcars . In such agreements, railcars
are simultaneously sold and leased back to the seller, typically for long-
term use 6. 20 Sale-leaseback agreements enable an operator to untie cash
invested in a railcar while still enjoying the use of the car. The third-
party lessor receives a steady income stream from the lease payments as
• 207
well as tax breaks associated with the depreciation of the railcars.
The nationality of land vehicles, unlike the nationality of vessels and
aircraft, is not controlled by international law. °8 Although some nations
explicitly define vehicle nationality as equivalent to the owner's nation-
. 209
ality for purposes of the temporary presence exception, most domestic
temporary presence statutes are silent on the issue. In any case, a vehicle
(as opposed to a vessel or an aircraft) can be registered in more than one
country; therefore its registration cannot be determinative of national-
ity.21
0
In National Steel Car H, the Federal Circuit reasoned in dictum that
such a leaseback agreement "might transform the rail car into a vehicle
203. Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2004) ("Nat'l Steel Car II").
204, Id.
205. See, e.g., Paul M. Van Arsdell et al., Toward a Theory of Business Finance: Discus-
sion, 10J. FIN. 144, 148 (1955).
206. Id.
207. See, generally, Myron B. Slovin, Marie E. Sushka & John A. Polonchek, Corporate
Sale-and-Leasebacks and Shareholder Wealth, 45 J. FIN. 289, 290 (1990).
208. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 159, at 28.
209. See supra note 72.
210. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 159, at 28 ("nationality does not carry much
weight" with regards to land vehicles).
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of the United States and thus remove the use of the invention from the
scope of the uses provided for in the first half of [the temporary presence
exception]." 2' No mention was made of the railcar's registration in de-
termining nationality; rather, the court focused on the nationality of the
legal owner of the vehicle."' Thus, the court seemed to imply that a ve-
hicle's nationality is determined by the legal owner of the vehicle, and
that nationality can be altered by selling the vehicle to a foreign corpora-
tion.
However, equating a vehicle's nationality with its owner's national-
ity creates opportunities for patent infringement avoidance through
creative lease agreements. Suppose, for example, that instead of entering
a sale-leaseback agreement with an American corporation, CPR had en-
tered into a sale-leaseback agreement with a Vietnamese corporation.
Entering into such a leaseback agreement would provide complete in-
fringement immunity to CPR. When entering the United States, the
railcars would be entering solely for the purpose of international com-
merce and would thus be protected from infringement under the
American temporary presence statute.2 3 The railcar was not patented in
Canada; thus CPR could not infringe in Canada. Even if a Canadian pat-
ent had been obtained, a railcar owned by a Vietnamese corporation
would not be subject to infringement when coming back into Canada
under the Canadian temporary presence statute.! 4 Thus, the railcars
would effectively be immune from infringement worldwide.
It should be noted, as it was by the Federal Circuit, that a sale-
leaseback agreement in National Steel Car II would have constituted a
"sale" of the invention, thereby removing the transaction from the pro-
. 215
tection of the temporary presence exception. To get around this in the
hypothetical above, the arrangement between CPR and a Vietnamese
corporation could not involve a sale (or an offer for sale) in a country in
which the railcars were patented. Thus, the Vietnamese corporation
would have to obtain the railcars from a third party, and then lease them
to CPR.
2' 6
211. Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2004) ("Nat'l Steel Car IF).
212. Id.
213. 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2008).
214. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, 23 (1985).
215. Nat'l Steel Carl!, 357 F.3d at 1334.
216. There is some disagreement as to the territorial limits on offers to sell. See Timothy
R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the United States to
Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 701, 726-59 (2004). Thus, even if the Viet-
namese corporation purchases the vehicles from a Canadian company, the temporary presence
exception may still allow complete liability immunity.
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B. The Current Extent of the Problem
This Article has argued that it is possible for conveyance owners to
take advantage of the loophole created by the temporary presence excep-
tion and the international conveyance registration system. There are three
ways in which an owner can evade infringement through choice of con-
veyance nationality: (1) choosing a flag nation in which few patents on
inventions relating to the conveyance have issued (in the case of vessels),
(2) choosing a flag nation into which the vehicle never enters, and there-
fore is not subject to the territorially limited patent laws (vessels), or (3)
through sale/leaseback agreements (in the case of vehicles). The com-
plete elimination of global patent liability is far beyond the protection
envisioned by the drafters of the Paris Convention . 7
While the exception has the potential to provide a loophole for po-
tential infringers, it is not clear to what extent the loophole is currently
being used. Indeed, there may be other factors that limit a conveyance
owner's ability to fully take advantage of the loophole. One such limita-
tion may be patentees choosing to enforce their patents in the country of
manufacture rather than in the country of use. Unauthorized manufacture
of a patented invention exposes the manufacturer to liability for patent
infringement.2 8 While a patent owner may not be able to enforce his pat-
ent against a conveyance engaged in international commerce due to the
temporary presence exception, the exception does not reduce patent
scope in the country of manufacture. It is possible that patentees rely on
infringement actions against unauthorized manufacturers, as opposed to
unauthorized users, in order to enforce their patent rights.
However, relying on enforcement of patent rights only at the point of
manufacture is unlikely to fully protect patentees. To obtain the right to
exclude, patentees must patent their invention in the country of manufac-
ture. Many countries in which patentees typically seek patent rights are
not large vessel-manufacturing countries. For instance, the United States
manufactures less than one percent of ships manufactured in the world,2 9
yet the United States Patent Office receives more patent applications that
any other office in the world.2 On the other hand, there are countries
(such as Taiwan) with ship-manufacturing industries that exceed the
217. See supra Part I.D.
218. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2008) (granting patentees the right to exclude others
from "making" the patented invention); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2008) (making the export
of a patented device for the purpose of foreign assembly a violation of the patent laws).
219. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., RESEARCH & INNOVATION TECH. ADMIN., BUREAU OF
TRANSP. STATISTICS, MARITIME TRADE & TRANSPORTATION, 2007 at 78 tbl.7-2 (2008), available
at http://www.bts.gov/publicafions/maritime-trade-and-transportation/2007/pdf/entire.pdf [here-
inafter MARITIME TRADE & TRANSP.].
220. See WIPO PATENT REPORT, supra note 188, at 14.
(Vol. 15:1
Hiding Behind Nationality
United States, yet whose patent offices grant significantly fewer pat-
ents. 2 ' Thus, to fully protect an invention, a patentee would have to
obtain patent rights in all countries in which a ship, or a ship part, is
manufactured. These countries may not be countries from which a pat-
entee would otherwise desire patent protection. The cost of obtaining
patent protection for vessel patents would thus increase by the amount
spent on prosecuting patents in the various manufacturing countries. This
increased cost also reduces the incentives to invest in the development of
technologies associated with international shipping.
Additionally, as globalization increases, the ship-manufacturing in-
dustry will likely become even less centralized. As this occurs, patentees
desiring global patent protection will be forced to patent their invention
in even more countries. Furthermore, patented devices that are "add-on"
conveyance technologies, such as navigational systems, can be manufac-
tured in an even wider variety of countries, thus increasing even further
the burden on patentees.
Even if patentees obtain global patent protection, most countries
have inadequate mechanisms for enforcing patents. Thus, although a
patentee may nominally have protected his intellectual property globally,
in reality he can only protect his rights in a limited number of countries.
A point regarding the doctrine of patent exhaustion should also be
noted. Patent exhaustion grants purchasers of a patented product the
right to use that product without being liable for infringement.222 If a
conveyance or any patented item embodied therein is purchased from a
patentee or an authorized licensee, it may be used with impunity.23 Thus,
a purchaser is not subject to infringement in the country in which the
device was purchased. However, exhaustion, like other elements of pat-
ent law, is generally territorially limited.224 Purchasing a patented device
from a French patentee grants the purchaser rights to use the invention in
France, but nowhere else.
The temporary presence exception allows conveyance owners to ig-
nore patents in all countries other than the conveyance's flag country.
Therefore, if a conveyance owner has obtained rights to use a patented
device in the flag country, he does not face patent liability regardless of
221. For example, Taiwan's ship-building industry manufactures over three times more
gross tonnage than the United States' industry. MARITIME TRADE & TRANSP., supra note 219,
at 78, tbl.7-2. Taiwan is not among the top 20 patent granting nations. WIPO PATENT REPORT,
supra note 188, at 2 1.
222. See generally Noel Chatterjee, Imperishable Intellectual Creations: The Limits of
the First Sale Doctrine, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383 (1995).
223. Id.
224. See CHISuM, supra note 42, § 16.03[2][a][iv] (In the United States, international
exhaustion has arisen often with regard to trademark and copyright, but relatively rarely with
regard to patents.).
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where the conveyance travels. Assuredly the vast majority of owners of
the international aircraft and vessels in use today have legitimately ob-
tained the rights to use the patented devices contained in their
conveyances. As described in this Article, however, the potential exists to
operate an international conveyance without first obtaining those patent
rights. This potential problem could lead to a reduction in value for
transportation patents resulting in fewer future advances in transportation
technology.
C. Institutional Problems Associated with Infringement Avoidance
The ability to avoid patent infringement through the temporary pres-
ence exception creates two potential problems that may aggravate the
infringement-avoidance loophole. First, if owners of international con-
veyances are able to evade infringement using the temporary presence
exception, the value of patents related to such conveyances may decline
because patentees will be unable to enforce their property rights. This
decline in patent value could lead to reduced incentives to innovate and
develop new technology in international transportation.225 Second, if end-
users of patented products successfully evade patent infringement they
will gain a competitive advantage over firms that do not take advantage
of the loophole, because those end-users that utilize the loophole face
reduced patent license CoStS.2 26 This would force all transportation firms
to take advantage of the loophole which could create competition among
countries that maintain "flag-of-convenience" registries. Countries
could be incentivized to lower patent enforcement and raise patentability
requirements. This reduction in patent enforcement could weaken certain
domestic patent systems.
If the use of the temporary presence exception significantly in-
creases, the value of patents on international conveyances will decline.
First, to protect their patents from selective avoidance, patentees may
seek patent protection in more countries than is currently cost-
225. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEx. L. REV. 989,995-96 (1997).
226. Unfortunately, reliable data on the average cost of negotiating and entering into
patent licenses is extremely limited. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent
Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1506 (2001).
227. Such competition is well-documented among "flag-of-convenience" countries. See,
e.g., Clifford B. Donn, Sailing Beyond the Reach of Workplace Regulations: Worker Exploita-
tion by MNCs on the High Seas, in MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND GLOBAL HUMAN
RESOURCES STRATEGIES 294-96 (William N. Cooke ed., 2003). This phenomenon has also
been studied among states competing for business registration. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, TRAD-
ING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 5, 6
(Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
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effective. 22' Filing additional domestic patent applications has the poten-
tial to greatly increase the cost associated with patenting an invention.22 9
Furthermore, conveyance owners will be less incentivized to license pat-
ents if they can avoid infringement of those patents by registering their
conveyance in a country with weak patent enforcement. The inability to
license a patent or to bring an infringement suit against unauthorized use
could decrease the value of patents in the international transport industry.
Patent theory predicts that if patents are reduced in value, investment
in research and development will likewise be reduced.2 30 A reduction in
research and development will lead to less innovation in the field. The
degree to which the exception is utilized will affect this reduction in
R&D spending: if the exception is not widely used, the reduction in de-
velopment will likely by negligible; however, if the use of the exception
in the shipping industry becomes widespread, the reduction in develop-
ment may become significant. The temporary presence exception
presents a potential cost to the transportation industry in the sense that if
the exception becomes commonly utilized, there may be reduced eco-
nomic rewards for innovators in the transportation area. This potential
for reduced incentives to innovate and increased costs in the transporta-
tion industry is in stark contrast to the purposes behind the exception.
Indeed, there is evidence that the shipbuilding industry does not secure
its intellectual property rights to the fullest extent possible, in part due to
the temporary presence exception.23'
The increased use of the temporary presence exception also has the
potential to weaken certain domestic patent systems. For example, if
Shipping Company A were able to use numerous patented technologies
in its ships without paying a licensing fee to the patent owner, the com-
pany would be able to reduce the price at which it bills its services. On
the other hand, Shipping Company B, which does not take advantage of
the temporary presence exception, would have a higher cost of doing
business than Company A, namely the cost of licensing the patented de-
vices used in its ships. To remain competitive, Shipping Company B
would be forced to either stop using the patented devices for which it
pays licensing fees, or to register its ships in such a way as to take ad-
vantage of the temporary presence exception. If a firm wanted to reduce
its patent licensing costs by means of the temporary presence exception,
228. See supra Part III.A.
229. Some scholars have suggested that prosecuting a patent application in the United
States alone averages from $10,000 to $30,000. Kimberly Moore, Xenophobia in American
Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1497, 1544-55 (2003).
230. See Lemley, supra note 225, at 995-96.
231. Shipbuilding IPR Study, Houthoff Buruma N.V. at 10, 105 (Dec. 14, 2007) available
at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/957809/Shipbui Iding- Intel lectual-Property-Rights-Study.
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it would search for a country that has few relevant patents or weak patent
enforcement.
Indeed, if the use of the exception greatly increases, countries with
weak patent systems would expect to see an increase in registration re-
quests for ships.232 Thus, as those countries competed to attract more
investment in their ship registry they would be incentivized to reduce
patent enforcement mechanisms and to raise the burdens of obtaining a
patent in the first place. This race-to-the-bottom for registering countries
has been well-documented in other aspects of shipping, such as reduced
taxes and regulations. 33 If companies increasingly seek to take advantage
of the temporary presence exception, a similar race-to-the-bottom for
patent enforcement may occur, especially for those countries that already
are engaged in competition for shipping registration.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
PATENT REGISTRY
The temporary presence exception is the product of hundreds of
hours of international preparation and negotiation. As various courts
have recognized, the time and effort spent in enacting the exception indi-
cates that the purpose of the exception has broad international appeal.234
However, as described in the preceding sections, the exception is over-
broad in that it provides a potential loophole from patent infringement
for the international transportation industry. This is particularly true for
vessels, due to the availability of "flag of convenience" registries. 211 It is
also a concern with land vehicles that engage in sale-leaseback arrange-
236
ments. 6 This section proposes a solution to the infringement loophole
created by the temporary presence exception's intersection with the per-
missive nationality standards of international law.
To completely do away with the exception because of the loophole
would eliminate the benefits that the exception provides to international
transport. These benefits include reduced informational costs and re-
duced global patent infringement liability.3 ' This section's proposal
seeks to retain the benefits of the temporary presence exception while
simultaneously protecting the value of patented inventions relating to the
232. See Lemley, supra note 225.
233. See VOGEL, supra note 227.
234. Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (stating that
the temporary presence exception "was of enough importance to occupy the attention of the
[U.S.] Congress and the negotiators of two treaties").
235. See supra Parts II.A., III.A. I.
236. See supra Parts II.C., III.A.2.
237. See supra Part I.D.
[Vol. 15:1
Hiding Behind Nationality
transportation industry. In short, the proposal seeks to retain the reduced
costs enjoyed by the international transportation industry due to the tem-
porary presence exception, while also maintaining the value of, and
incentives to invest in, technology applicable to the international trans-
portation industry. The proposal also seeks to retain, to the extent
possible, the current structures of the international patent system and to
avoid creating burdensome regulatory oversight.
A. The Proposal
In order to eliminate the infringement loophole created by the tem-
porary presence exception, two changes to the current international
patent system should be implemented; one which is significant and one
which is minor. The significant change involves an amendment to Article
5ter of the Paris Convention that would create an international registry of
patents applicable to international vessels. The second change calls for
the adoption of a standard judicial interpretation of land vehicle national-
ity for purposes of the temporary presence exception.
An amendment to Article 5ter is needed to close the loophole created
for vessels registered in "flag of convenience" nations. Due to the prolif-
eration and international recognition of "flag of convenience" registries,
owners can register their vessels in countries into which a vessel never
enters or in countries with weak domestic patent systems, thereby ob-
taining global patent infringement immunity.138  Patentees of
improvements in vessel technology are therefore unable to fully enforce
their patent rights against vessels registered in "flag of convenience" na-
tions.23 9
To reestablish the ability of patentees to protect their inventions, this
Article proposes an amendment to Article 5ter in which a patent registry
is created that would place registered patents outside the scope of the
temporary presence exception. This International Registry of Vessel Pat-
ents would operate only with relation to the temporary presence
exception. Patentees would continue to obtain patents from domestic
patent offices. Once a patent issues, a patentee could apply to have the
patent included in the registry, for a fee. Inclusion in the newly created
registry would overcome a defense of non-infringement based on the
temporary presence exception.
The registry would not confer any special rights upon the listed pat-
ents other than to overcome a defense of temporary presence in the
country in which the patent has issued. Inclusion in the registry would
not indicate any higher proof of validity than the patent already
238. See supra Parts II.A., III.A.I.
239. Id.
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possesses. Validity determinations (including novelty, inventive step, and
patentable subject matter) would continue to be determined by domestic
patent offices, not by the maintainer of the registry. Nor would the regis-
try "internationalize" the patent in any way. The patent would remain
valid only in the country or countries in which it had been issued domes-
tically. Thus, for example, inclusion of a Canadian patent in the registry
would not give the patent holder any additional rights outside of Canada.
Similarly, a U.S. patent included in the registry would only overcome a
defense based on 35 U.S.C. § 272, and only in patent disputes in the
United States.
Patent registries are used in other areas of patent law. For example,
in the United States, the so-called "orange book" is the authoritative ref-
erence source for all drug product patents that have been approved by the
Food and Drug Administration.240 Inclusion of a patent in the orange
book does not provide additional support for the validity of a patent, but
serves to give notice to potential infringers. The proposed registry sys-
tem would operate in a similar fashion.
An amendment to Article 5ter might take the following form:
Section 1 of this Article [exempting patented devices on vessels
from infringement] shall not apply to the use of patented devices
on board vessels temporarily present in the waters of said coun-
try, if said device is patented in said country and is registered in
the International Registry of Vessel Patents.
This proposed change to the Paris Convention has numerous benefits
for patentees. Perhaps most importantly, with the registry in place, the
value of patents related to international vessels would not risk becoming
artificially deflated due to the temporary presence exception. Patentees
of inventions related to international vessels would not be forced to pat-
ent inventions in dozens of countries to enforce their patents.4 Instead,
patentees would be able to select the countries in which the costs of ob-
taining a patent are less than the expected benefits of having the right to
exclude.242 Patentees could thus choose to patent inventions only in the
countries with the largest number of potential users. Reducing the num-
ber of countries in which patent protection is sought will greatly reduce
240. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
241. See supra Part III.
242. Patentees would still be forced to make decisions, oftentimes difficult ones, regard-
ing the choice of countries in which to apply for a patent and prosecute their invention. These
decisions, however, apply to all technological fields, and are not unique to patents related to
international shipping.
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the cost of obtaining patent protection.2 43 Furthermore, the ability to
overcome the temporary presence exception would give patentees the
ability to bring infringement suits against unauthorized users, which
would increase a patentee's ability to obtain licensing fees from vessel
owners.
Under the proposed amendment, vessel owners who have not obtained
licenses on patented inventions due to the protection of the temporary
presence exception, would be forced to obtain permission to use patents
included in the registry. International shippers would therefore have an
increased informational burden as compared to the current system. Instead
of having to be familiar with only the conveyance's home patent system,
owners would need to familiarize themselves with the patents in the regis-
try as well.
However, such a registration system would not require international
shippers to be familiar with every patent in every country in which they
enter; vessels would still not be subject to patents not included in the
register. Under the proposed registry system, the patent search costs for
owners would remain relatively low compared to international technolo-
gies in other fields that do not enjoy the benefits of the temporary
presence exception. With this proposed amendment, vessels would be
subject to the patent laws of their flag country (as they are under the cur-
rent system) as well as the patents included in the registry. Therefore, a
vessel owner would have to be familiar with only the patents contained
in the registry that were issued from countries into which the vessel en-
ters.
For example, the Jonathan Swift, as an Irish ferry, would have to be
familiar with Irish patents as well as any English patents contained in the
registry. The informational costs associated with patent clearance would
remain relatively low under the registry system because all of the appli-
cable patents are contained in one international registry, as opposed to
various domestic patent offices. Thus, vessel owners would be put on
notice of all applicable patents through the registry which would provide
a single reference for all of the foreign patents with which a vessel
owner must comply.
The second, more minor change proposed by this Article, is one of
judicial interpretation. The amendment of the Paris Convention and the
creation of an international registry of vessel patents would close the
patent infringement loophole for vessels. However, as described above,
owners of land vehicles may be able to skirt the patent laws by entering
243. For more on the cost of obtaining patent protection in the United States, see Moore,
supra note 229, at 1544-55.
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into sale-leaseback agreements 2 ' The ability of owners to shield their
vehicle from liability depends on the judicial interpretation of vehicle
nationality. Because vehicle nationality is not defined by international
law, 4 5 it is not entirely clear what factors courts faced with the issue will
use to determine nationality. If the nationality of the legal owner is used
as a proxy for vehicle nationality, as was the case in National Steel Car,
sale-leaseback agreements may be able to shield a vehicle from in-
fringement liability.
4 6
Therefore, courts faced with a temporary presence defense involving
land vehicles should not determine nationality based on owner's nation-
ality alone. Instead, nationality determinations for vehicles should be
based on a multitude of factors, such as time spent in various nations,
location of vehicle storage, location in which repairs take place, as well
as ownership. Courts should look at a vehicle's use, as well as the vehi-
cle's owner, in order to determine nationality. Factors such as the storage
location and the time spent within various nations cannot be easily ma-
nipulated in order to take advantage of the temporary presence
exception, whereas ownership can.
Adopting usage factors along with ownership as a means of deter-
mining vehicle nationality benefits patentees by reducing the amount of
domestic patents needed to protect an invention. Patentees concerned
about unauthorized use of their invention in vehicles in the United States
would need to seek patents only in surrounding countries, i.e., Mexico
and Canada, in addition to the United States. If courts adopted usage
factors for nationality determinations, land vehicles present in the United
States would be less likely to be found to be vehicles of any other nation.
It should be noted that while this change only requires a judicial rule
of law in most nations, some nations have explicitly defined vehicle na-
tionality.4 7 In those countries, the statutory schemes would have to be
altered in order to define vehicle nationality as separate from the owner's
nationality for purposes of the temporary presence exception.
B. Potential Drawbacks
There are, of course, potential drawbacks to the creation of an inter-
national registry of vessel patents. It is not a simple task to amend an
international treaty like the Paris Convention that has nearly two-
hundred member-nations. Furthermore, there is a cost involved with
creating an institution to create and maintain such a registry. Also, a
244. See supra Parts II.C., III.A.2.
245. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 159, at 76.
246. See supra Part 1I1.A.2.
247. See supra note 72.
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plausible argument can be made that, although the temporary presence
exception creates a method for avoiding patent infringement for vessel
owners, the extent of the use of the loophole is not clear and therefore
amending the exception is unnecessary.
The cost of creating such a registry system, however, would likely be
minimal. The creation of a new international organization is not neces-
sary. The registry could be maintained by an organization currently in
existence, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
As the patents contained in the registry would already have been granted
by a domestic patent office prior to inclusion, there is no need to employ
examiners to review the validity or patentability of the subject matter
included in the registry. Furthermore, as the registry would not determine
or influence the validity of any patent, there would be no need to com-
pare the patents to prior art in the field; such a task is already undertaken
at the domestic patent office and court system.
Of course, some amount of oversight would be necessary from
WIPO in order to determine whether the subject matter covered by a
patent truly has application in international vessels. Unfortunately, de-
termining whether a patent potentially could be or is used in
international vessels is a difficult task. Some method for determining the
applicability of a patent to international shipping is necessary to ensure
that the registry does not balloon to include an enormous number of pat-
ents.
This can be accomplished in two ways. First, a required registration
fee would discourage patentees whose inventions were unrelated to in-
ternational vessels from improperly attempting to register their patents.
Patentees of inventions with minimal or tangential relation to vessels,
such as improved carpet fibers or interior lighting methods, will be
unlikely to pay a registration fee when the fee exceeds any predicted in-
fringement award resulting from unauthorized use aboard international
vessels. The fee system could also involve periodic renewal fees which
would further dissuade patentees of less-applicable and less-valuable
patents from registering. Along with maintaining the registry at a reason-
able size, the registration fee system could fund the minor oversight
needed to maintain the registry.
Second, the registry could be limited to patents with international
classifications that apply to international vessels and related equipment:
namely, international classification B63. 24' This classification is reserved
248. B63 applies to "Ships or Other Waterborne Vessels; Related Equipment." WIPO
Int'l Classifications, available at http://www.wipo.int/classifications/fulltext/new-ipc/pdf/e/
class/b63.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
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for inventions that are used on vessels, such as ship engines and ballast
systems.
Limiting the registry to this classification number has the disadvan-
tage of eliminating from registration certain patents which are, in fact,
used in the body of international vessels. This is especially true for pat-
ents on electronics, such as wireless communications, as well as radar
and sonar technologies. Such technologies likely have a broader applica-
tion than transportation devices, and thus will be classified elsewhere by
WIPO. The exclusion of these patents from the registry is less than ideal.
However, such electronic patents are also widely used in areas other than
international shipping. Because electronic devices have significant value
outside the realm of transportation, excluding such inventions from the
registry is unlikely to significantly harm the incentives to create and de-
velop electronic devices.
On the other hand, patents specifically classified as applying to
transportation devices likely derive the majority of their economic value
from improved conveyance performance, and therefore the economic
incentives encouraging innovation in these areas are more likely to be
decreased by the abuse of the temporary presence exception. Therefore,
inclusion of only those patents in the registry, while less than ideal, cor-
rectly identifies and includes the patents most likely to be negatively
effected by the temporary presence exception.
Lastly, it could be argued that implementation of this Article's pro-
posal is unnecessary, as the extent to which vessel owners take
advantage of the temporary presence exception's loophole is unclear.249
While the extent to which vessel owners utilize the temporary presence
exception to avoid patent infringement is unclear, there is ample evi-
dence that "flag of convenience" registries attract and compete for the
registration fees of foreign-owned vessels.25° Countries maintaining these
registries compete by reducing taxes, regulations, and oversight involved
in the shipping industry.25' As international transportation increases along
with the competition for vessel registration, countries competing for ves-
sel registration may take advantage of the legal framework created by the
temporary presence exception to further attract foreign registrants. To do
so would involve not only reducing the enforcement of patents relating
to vessels, but also increasing the costs associated with obtaining patents
in the first place.5 2
249. But see supra note 231.
250. See sources cited supra note 227.
251. Id.
252. See supra Part IlI.C.
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TRIPS and other international agreements have established mini-
mum levels of domestic patent protection across the globe. 253 Allowing
the temporary presence exception to potentially erode the standards of
certain domestic patent systems is at odds with the effort and expense
allocated to establishing the international baseline of patent protection in
TRIPS.5 4 This Article's proposals would eliminate the incentives for
countries to weaken their patent systems in an effort to attract foreign
vessel registration.
CONCLUSION
The temporary presence exception provides a loophole in which
owners of conveyances engaged in international commerce can evade
patent infringement liability on an international level. The loophole
arises from the exception's nationality requirement as well as the conflu-
ence of two distinct legal regimes: domestic patent laws and
international conveyance registration systems. This Article has identified
the manner in which patent infringement liability can be avoided,
namely, by employing existing "flag of convenience" vessel registries or
by entering into sale-leaseback agreements. To solve the problem of an
overbroad exception from infringement liability for international con-
veyances, this Article proposes amending the Paris Convention to
establish an international registry of vessel patents. A patent's inclusion
in the registry would overcome a defense of patent infringement based
on the temporary presence exception. Such a registry would retain the
policy goals behind the temporary presence exception while eliminating
the potential for patent infringement avoidance. This Article further pro-
poses that domestic courts interpreting the temporary presence exception
adopt a test for land vehicle nationality that involves factors related to
the vehicle's physical presence within various nations.
253. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Symposium: Patent System Reform: Harmony and Diversity
in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 688 (2002) (describing TRIPS as requiring "na-
tions to conform their patent laws to a uniform framework of international standards").
254. Id.
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